The articles in the collection 250 for the 250th: The American Revolution in Monmouth County represent the most complete history of this topic ever assembled. < 250 Home < Previous pg. Next > Henry Lee's Continentals Raid Sandy Hook by Michael Adelberg As recently as 2018, Sandy Hook Bay froze-over, making it impassable. The frozen bay in January 1780 permitted a daring over-ice raid against the British naval base by Continental soldiers. - January 1780 - As noted in prior articles, Henry “Light Horse Harry” Lee commanded a regiment of Virginia cavalry. Lee’s regiment was first sent into Monmouth County in early 1779 , setting up camp at Freehold. Lee spent much of 1779 in Monmouth County. During that time, he sent scouts parties along the shore to search for and establish contact with the French fleet , which was expected to anchor on the Monmouth shore. Lee was also active in local affairs, which put him at odds with some local leaders. For example, Lee’s men supported some magistrates in collecting provisions from disaffected neighborhoods—a controversial practice that split Monmouth leaders. His men also hunted down the notorious Pine Robber, Lewis Fenton, and they launched a bold raid against the British naval base at Sandy Hook. Even in the cold of winter, Lee camped or boarded men near Sandy Hook. On January 5, 1780, Lee wrote George Washington that "I have heard from one of my officers on the shore, who has taken a British officer with five others, & 80,000 counterfeit dollars, I hope this capture will lead to some useful discoveries." Lee informed Washington that he had sent the money and prisoners to Philadelphia. Washington responded "I am exceedingly glad to hear of the capture of a British officer and his associates." But then, on January 8, ordered Lee’s men to leave the county—likely in response to a letter of complaint from Governor William Livingston about Lee’s conduct. However, Lee did not leave immediately. The captured British party likely provided information on the weak condition of the British garrison at Sandy Hook, as did the capture of the Loyalist brig , Britannia , near Sandy Hook on December 30. The weather grew colder, punctuated by a storm that drove several ships onto Monmouth County’s beaches, and the Sandy Hook Bay froze over. Colonel Lewis Nicola (stationed at Egg Harbor) noted a new weakness of Sandy Hook: "Seven deserters from the guard ship at the Hook made their escape on the ice." Desertions from the guard ship at Sandy Hook had been a problem for several months. Three times in 1779, Nicola recorded incidents in which a total of nine sailors deserted from the Hunter , which was the guard ship at Sandy Hook through most of the year. Successful small raids on Sandy Hook by Captain John Burrowes demonstrated that small attacks on the base could be successful when the goal was to carry off a single vessel. Lee’s Continentals Raid Sandy Hook Lee wrote Washington on January 12: "I detached an officer & party for the purpose of taking advantage of the ice to transport troops to the Hook for important business of collecting supplies for the support of the Army... committed the enterprise to Capt. Peyton, an officer of singular worth." Other sources note that a winter storm occurred that day, driving three ships ashore on the Jersey coast. The Pennsylvania Evening Post first reported on Lee’s raid on January 16: We hear that a large quantity of Counterfeit Continental money was taken a few days ago by a Party of Lee's Light Dragoons in Monmouth County… there was also found a considerable quantity of goods which had been sent from New York for sale at the same time. Several persons were taken, among whom was Anthony Woodward's son [Thomas Woodward]. Lee wrote Washington more about the raid on January 16. He noted that the raid was led by a Captain Peyton, who landed on Sandy Hook and hoped to attack the light house: The noise of the men marching occasioned by the snow, alarmed the garrison; of course the attempt at the Light House was [therefore] omitted, agreeable to orders. Their shipping was assaulted, and three officers were taken some time since, will be sent to Philadelphia. The counterfeit money I sent to be burnt. Another officer in Lee’s raiding party, Alan McLane, recalled the counterfeit money. They "took it by surprise, brought off prisoners with a large quantity of Continental bills so well executed that Mr. Smith, the loan officer in Philadelphia could not discover the difference between them & regular bills." Follow-up newspaper accounts provided additional details on Captain’s Peyton’s raid. The Pennsylvania Evening Post published a second account: Major Lee detached from Burlington [Freehold] forty men under command of Captain Patten [Peyton], in sleighs, who before the next morning were beside the guard ship, lying frozen in ice at Sandy Hook, so that they could not board her; they retired a small distance unperceived, where they surprised two schooners and a sloop, made the men prisoners, burnt the vessels, and returned without the least loss, bringing with them the prisoners and all the plunder they thought proper. The New Jersey Gazette also reported on the Sandy Hook raid with somewhat different details: We are informed that on Thursday night, Captain Rudolph of Lee's Rangers, a sergeant, a corporal and eight men, landed at Sandy Hook within a half mile of the Light House--surrounded a house and made seven of the enemy prisoners; they also brought off $45,000 in counterfeit Continental dollars, a quantity of hard money, and several parcels of dry goods, without any loss. Transporting the prisoners all the way to Philadelphia in the middle of the winter was a miserable task. So, Lee apparently commandeered space in the Monmouth County jail (in the basement of the county courthouse at Freehold). This put Lee at odds with William Lawrence, the county jailkeeper. On March 1, Lawrence petitioned the New Jersey Assembly: Setting forth that Major Lee had, in contempt of the law, taken possession of his dwelling room and quartered a number of men against his consent; that he [Lee] had also taken charge of and maintained a number of different prisoners confined for different crimes and misdemeanors; and praying that his [Lee's] account [counter-charges] may be discharged. It is unclear if the Assembly acted on the matter. Leading forty-men in sleighs over a frozen bay during a winter storm to attack an enemy that, if alarmed, possessed substantially more men and firepower, was a daring endeavor. Major Lee’s men executed this raid flawlessly. They filled their sleighs with booty, burned three small ships, captured several prisoners, and took tens of thousands of dollars in counterfeit money—and then retreated without the loss of a man. Throughout the Revolutionary War, few actions were as bold and successful. In the local war in and around Monmouth County, perhaps only William Marriner’s June 1778 raid of Brooklyn was bolder and more successful than the exceptional raid-by-sleigh undertaken by Lee’s men on January 12, 1780. Related Historic Site : Sandy Hook Lighthouse Sources : Allan McLane, Army and Navy Chronicle (New York: Benjamin Homans, 1838) p130-1; Henry Lee to George Washington, Library of Congress, George Washington Papers, series 4, reel 63, January 5, 1780; George Washington to Henry Lee, Library of Congress, George Washington Papers, Series 4, General Correspondence; George Washington’s General Orders, John Fitzpatrick, ed., The Writings of George Washington from the Original Manuscript Sources (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1932) vol. 17, p 362; William Horner, This Old Monmouth of Ours (Freehold: Moreau Brothers, 1932) p 68-9; Library of Congress, Early American Newspapers, Pennsylvania Evening Post, January 1780; Henry Lee to George Washington, Library of Congress, George Washington Papers, http://memory.loc.gov/mss/mgw/mgw4/063/0700/0735.jpg ; Archives of the State of New Jersey, Extracts from American Newspapers Relating to New Jersey (Paterson, NJ: Call Printing, 1903) vol. 4, pp. 154-5. Howard Peckham, The Toll of Independence (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974) p 67; Library of Congress, Early American Newspaper, New Jersey Gazette, reel 1930, January 1780; The Library Company, New Jersey Votes of the Assembly, March 1, 1780, p 132; Lewis Nicola to Congress, National Archives, Papers of the Continental Congress, reel 187, item 169, #35, 116, 136, 191; State of the Rebel Army, William Clements Library, Henry Clinton Papers, vol. 86. Previous Next

The articles in the collection 250 for the 250th: The American Revolution in Monmouth County represent the most complete history of this topic ever assembled. < 250 Home < Previous pg. Next > Alarm Beacons Constructed in Monmouth County by Michael Adelberg Fired beacons could speed news of a British incursion into New Jersey. The chain of 23 beacons across New Jersey included three in Monmouth County, but the Monmouth beacons were short-lived. - April 1779 - In 1779, the British, believing the South was filled with Loyalists, sent an Army to invade Georgia. In the North, they replaced major campaigns with raids into New Jersey. George Washington camped inland near Morristown and relied on riders to inform him of British incursions. But riders were sometimes unreliable, and messages took several hours to deliver under even the best circumstances. In 1778, Continental and New Jersey leaders discussed establishing beacons which, when fired, could be seen by men attending the next beacon—lighting a chain of beacons could, in theory, speed word of a British attack. Beacons were not a new idea. For centuries, they had been used on the continent of Europe to spread news of enemy attack. In New Jersey, the nascent state government’s Council of Safety, at its first meeting on January 10, 1776, recommended the construction of a set of warning beacons along the shore. Three months later, George Washington forwarded a plan to the New Jersey Provincial Congress for constructing beacons between the Navesink Highlands and Woodbridge. The beacons would alert New Jersey militia and the Continental Army of a British landing or a fleet arriving at Sandy Hook, but it is unlikely that beacons were constructed in 1776 amidst other competing priorities. Monmouth County’s Warning Beacons The plan to construct beacons across the parts of New Jersey most exposed to attacks reached fruition. in March 1779, George Washington wrote Governor William Livingston of a plan developed by General William Alexander (Lord Stirling) to construct 23 beacons from the Watchung Mountains southwest to Amwell and east through northern Monmouth County. Of the first eight beacons, Washington wrote: “I will have them erected.” For the rest, Washington requested that “Your Excellency [Livingston] will be pleased to give the order." This meant that fifteen beacons would be built and maintained by New Jersey militia. Stirling’s description of the hoped-for beacons included this instruction: Each of the beacons are to be of the following dimensions: at bottom, fourteen feet square, to rise in a pyramidal form to about eighteen or twenty feet high, and then to terminate about six feet square, with a stout sapling in the center of about thirty feet high from the ground. According to a list compiled by Baron Johan DeKalb – the last three beacons would be in Monmouth County "on Carter Hill in Monmouth" (near Freehold); "on Middletown Hill" and "on Mount Pleasant." A fourth beacon near the Navesink Highlands was not included in Stirling’s plan based on the advice of Joseph Holmes, one of Monmouth County’s legislators – presumably it would be impossible to defend . An April order discussed that the Monmouth beacons were to be fired when "the enemy invades Monmouth County or any part of Middlesex south of Raritan, or on the first appearance of the enemy going up Amboy Bay." On April 12, General Nathaniel Heard of Middlesex County, commanding the Monmouth militia, wrote to Colonel Asher Holmes, commanding the Freehold and Middletown militias. Heard’s detailed direction included instruction that "these fires should be made of logs intermixed with brush squares at the bottom, about sixteen feet high and to diminish as they rise like a pyramid, and should be 18 or 20 feet high." Heard’s orders reveal that he was more concerned with battling enemy raiders than getting word to Washington. He ordered beacons further forward than Stirling and he required that the beacons serve as militia rallying points. He wrote: I have received orders from General Dickinson [Philemon Dickinson] to execute and erect beacons for your militia in case of alarm… you will immediately order the officers commanding to have their men attending the firing of these beacons. When the beacons fired militia were ordered to muster at each of them: 1. companies of Michael Sweetman, John Walton, David Gordon, William Van Cleaf were to meet at the beacon at Bray's meeting house (south of Middletown); 2. companies of John Schenck, William Schenck and Samuel Carhart were to meet at the beacon on Vanderbelt's Hill (near Middletown); 3. companies of John Stillwell, Barnes Smock and Theophilus Little were to meet at the beacon on Ruckman's Hill (near Navesink). The militia’s Light Horse company was to "be divided in three divisions, each of which to repair to each of the three posts, that they may forward intelligence from one post to the others." Holmes would oversee the construction of the beacons and would be compensated for expenses directly related to their construction: “You must keep an exact account of expenses attending to the fixing of these beacons which you will be pleased to transmit regularly." The Loyalist officer, Elisha Lawrence, formerly of Upper Freehold, compiled a map of Monmouth County in spring, 1779. The map was likely to assist raiding parties and illegal traders . The map showed the location of beacons on Garretts Hill (west of Navesink Highlands); a beach on Highlands marked "watering place" (fresh water well); and on the Middletown shore opposite Horseshoe Bay on the Sandy Hook Peninsula. The map also showed the location of four companies of Benjamin Ford’s Continental troops in Monmouth County, one at Middletown, two more at Eatontown, and one at Tinton Falls. The map, if correct, showed that beacons were constructed far closer to the British base at Sandy Hook than Stirling had suggested and slightly closer than Heard had ordered—but it is possible that Lawrence’s map was incorrect. Short Life of Monmouth County’s Beacons What became of the beacons is unclear. Perhaps they were never fully constructed or perhaps they were fired once and not rebuilt. If they were as close to Sandy Hook as Lawrence’s map suggests, then the men firing those beacons were in great danger of capture . At least in Monmouth County, there is no reason to believe the beacons were long-lived. A May 1780 list of New Jersey militia rally points had the Monmouth militia assembling at South Amboy “along the shore towards Middletown” and at Deal. Beacons go unmentioned in the order. In the three northeast townships (Freehold, Middletown and Shrewsbury), militia used “signal cannon” to indicate alarm and summon the militia. As early as September 1778, there is a documentation that militia “went on the boom" of the cannon, and men were fined for not turning out when the gun was fired. The booms of this cannon were likely effective at alarming the militia because a Loyalist newspaper particularly called out the disabling of the Middletown militia signal cannon in its report of the June 1780 raid that captured Captain Barnes Smock of Middletown. In post-war veteran pension applications, six Monmouth militiamen from the Northeast townships mention marching at the boom of signal cannon, but none mention marching at the firing of a beacon: John Aumock recalled mustering on “a general alarm (which was announced by the firing of the alarm gun kept by Colo. Holmes), and then all the militia were called out together." John Carhart remembered,” under a signal from the alarm gun, the militia of the neighborhood, whether out under regular duty or not, repaired with all speed to the place of rendezvous.” Garrett Jeffrey recalled he would “repair immediately to all points of attack on the discharge of the alarm gun.” John Matthews also recalled mustering at the firing of a signal cannon: “the militia immediately laying aside all business at the report of the alarm gun & repairing to the place of rendezvous.” Koert Schenck recalled "all the militia were called out on the firing of the alarm gun.” Derrick Sutphin marched at the alarm gun, including a boom just after his wedding: “was called out the same week as the wedding, after the marriage, the alarm gun firing at Colo. Holmes’.” There are no accounts of the Monmouth militia responding to an alarm via the lighting of a beacon. Riders continued to be used to alert George Washington on events along the Monmouth shore and Sandy Hook through the end of the war. Related Historic Site : Beacon Pole Hill (Rhode Island) Sources : Bob Rupert, The Blue Hills Beacons, Journal of the American Revolution, April 29, 2015, https://allthingsliberty.com/2015/04/the-blue-hills-beacons/#google_vignette ; Peter Force, American Archives: Consisting of a Collection of Authentick Records, State Papers, Debates, and Letters and Other Notices of Publick Affairs (Washington, DC: U.S. Congress Clerk's Office, 1853), 5th Series, vol. 4, pp. 660, 662-3; Peter Force, American Archives: Consisting of a Collection of Authentick Records, State Papers, Debates, and Letters and Other Notices of Publick Affairs (Washington, DC: U.S. Congress Clerk's Office, 1853), 5th Series, vol. 1, p 1165; Minutes of the Provincial Congress and Council of Safety of New Jersey (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009) p 327; George Washington to William Livingston, John Fitzpatrick, ed., The Writings of George Washington from the Original Manuscript Sources (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1932) vol. 14, pp. 281-3; Elisha Lawrence, Map, U. of Michigan, Clements Library, Map 237, Monmouth County; James Raleigh, "Beacon Bicentennial--1779," Monmouth County Historical Association Newsletter, vol. 7, n2, 1779, p1; Nathaniel Heard to Asher Holmes, Monmouth County Historical Association, Cherry Hall Papers, box 5, folder 3; Cherry Hall Papers, box 1; John Clayton to Asher Holmes, Monmouth County Historical Association, Cherry Hall Papers, box 5, folder 9; John Stillwell, Historical and Genealogical Miscellany (Baltimore: Genealogical Publishing Co., 1970) v3, p341; George Washington to John Neilson, May 1780,” Founders Online, National Archives http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-02-01952, ver. 2013-09-28); National Archives, Revolutionary War Veterans' Pension Application, John Matthews of NJ, www.fold3.com/image/#23666685 ; National Archives, Revolutionary War Veterans' Pension Application, Garrett Jeffrey of NJ, www.fold3.com/image/#24630193 ; National Archives, Revolutionary War Veterans Pension Applications, New Jersey - Derrick Sutphin; National Archives, Revolutionary War Veterans Pension Applications, New Jersey - John Carhart; National Archives, Revolutionary War Veterans Pension Applications, New Jersey - John Aumock; National Archives, Revolutionary War Veterans Pension Applications, New Jersey - Koert Schenck. 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The articles in the collection 250 for the 250th: The American Revolution in Monmouth County represent the most complete history of this topic ever assembled. < 250 Home < Previous pg. Next > David Forman's Informants In and From New York by Michael Adelberg In August 1781, George Washington’s Army marched to Yorktown to besiege the trapped British Army. David Forman’s intelligence kept him apprised of British moves during the march. - June 1777 - In spring 1777, combat lines hardened. The British controlled lower New York and small pieces of New Jersey, including Sandy Hook. The rest of New Jersey was under the Continental government (though much of the New Jersey coast and pinelands remained weakly governed). Both sides sought intelligence on the strength and movements of the other. The large number of Monmouth County Loyalist refugees and pervasive illegal trade with New York created human bonds between New York and Monmouth County that could be exploited for intelligence gathering. David Forman, Monmouth County’s de facto leader in 1777, placed himself at the center of this sensitive activity. David Forman’s First Spy in New York, Robert Ireland The first documented spy to go to New York from Monmouth County was Robert Ireland. On June 3, 1777, David Forman wrote General John Sullivan about Ireland: “He fell in to the enemy's hands last winter, at the time when the enemy penetrated this State -- they have since employed him as a shoer to the British horse." Forman called Ireland "friendly to our cause" and proposed sending him back to New York as a spy: [He] has gained the entire confidence of several soldiers and was so generally known as a horse shoer, he could pass unsuspected amongst the troops... I therefore proposed his returning on the plan of getting intelligence -- He agreed to it. -- The copy of his oath I enclose herewith, I had him conducted by an officer beyond the guards last night and is gone off by way of the Hook. Forman noted that Ireland’s family remained in Shrewsbury and could be used as human collateral to keep Ireland honest. "His wife and family being in my hands will be at all times a proper check on him." Sullivan’s response has not survived, but it appears that Ireland engaged in spying, was discovered, and was taken by the British. On March 28, 1778, Ezekiel Williams, a member of the Continental Congress, wrote Elias Boudinot, the Continental government’s Commissary of Prisoners, about Boudinot’s proposal to involve Ireland in a prisoner exchange. Williams wrote, "I have no objection to the release of Ireland, provided he is altogether a common prisoner of war." Ireland’s whereabouts later in the war are unknown, but he is absent from the county’s tax lists, so it can be assumed that he did not stay in Monmouth County. (Perhaps because he was no longer safe; many shore Whigs moved inland for safety.) Other Sources of Intelligence Between 1777 – 1782, David Forman was responsible for sending literally dozens of intelligence reports to George Washington on British movements at Sandy Hook. These reports were usually drafted by Forman or a subordinate, particularly Captain John Burrowes and John Stillwell. They camped on the Navesink Highlands and reported on what they saw. At times, these reports were quite valuable and Washington praised Forman and requested additional reports. At other times, Washington was able to rely on other Continental Officers stationed in the area, most notably Major Richard Howell in the summer of 1778. These reports are the subject of another article . Intelligence was gathered from Americans returning from New York and British deserters. For example, in July 1780, David Forman sent George Washington intelligence taken from Lieutenant Joseph Wolcott, who had been a prisoner in New York prior to a prisoner exchange. Wolcott watched British ships while being transported to Sandy Hook for his exchange: At the Narrows he fell in with five large transports—The vessell he was in run close by two of the Transports, he saw they ware full of troops—There uniform red ground turnd up white or pale Buff—Instead of Buttons on the Hips they ware Trim’d with Lace or fringe—that the Officers of the flagg informed him they ware Lord Rawdon’s or some such Core—That on Tuesday before he was exchanged he saw the said five ships go to sea and stand southward. A different type of returning American was Joseph Mount. He lived in Middletown and went off with a Loyalist raiding party in April 1779. After two weeks in New York, Mount came home and reported on what he saw to Captain John Burrowes: “he had the liberty of the town granted to him, convenient to his being a Friend of [British] Government - he says General Clinton with 7000 troops were on board of the fleet and going in a secret expedition.” However, Mount illegally brought a large quantity of fabrics, sewing wares, and sugar on his return. These were seized by Continental Army Colonel Benjamin Ford and suggest that Mount was a person of ambiguous loyalty. Forman and other Monmouth leaders interrogated a string of British deserters during the war. For example, in July 1780, he wrote his ally in the New Jersey Assembly, Nathaniel Scudder, about the intelligence provided by a deserter. Forman reported that the feared Colonel John Simcoe, with 300 men, was preparing to attack Amboy and “he will more than probably make his retreat through Sandy Hook.” Forman used the opportunity to press for supplies to the troops in Monmouth County, listing the specific detachments lacking ammunition. He then concluded, "This is our present situation - a frontier county, at all times exposed to incursion, now immediately threatened, with not a single dozen cartridges to be given out." The intelligence proved wrong—Simcoe did not attack in October 1780. On another occasion, British Navy deserters allowed Forman to compile a list of warships at New York and a picture of the defenses at Sandy Hook consisting of "fire ships" and several sunken ship hulks "loaded with stone for sinking in the channel." David Forman’s “Intelligencers” During the Yorktown Campaign During the Yorktown campaign (fall 1781), General Charles Cornwallis’s British Army was trapped on the York Peninsula in Virginia and Washington marched much of his army south to participate in the siege. The key question throughout the campaign was when and with what level of force the British fleet in New York would seek to rescue their trapped army. Intelligence reports from David Forman on British movements in New York were critical. Historian Burke Davis noted that David Forman's reports during the Yorktown campaign were the single most important source of intelligence on the British attempts to relieve Cornwallis at Yorktown. To meet the need, Forman created an informant network in New York. The first word of this network is in a July 23 letter from Forman to Washington (a month before Washington began his march). Forman had heard from an informant in New York and wrote that "I have lately obtained from New York a list of the British Line ships” which he forwarded. Forman also warned that he was having "the greatest difficulty in employing horsemen to forward intelligence.” This would lead to delays in the future. In September 1781, Forman wrote Washington that his "intelligencers who live in the power of the enemy must be dealt with very guardedly on acct of their personal safety and to gain their confidence - I therefore dare not send a messenger to them for fear of alarming them or cause suspicion in others." Later that month, Forman wrote Washington about the first mission undertaken by one of his spies: "This evening, under cover of night, one of my intelligencers called upon the enemy." In October, Forman received and forwarded intelligence on British movements in New York Harbor. The intelligence, Forman wrote, "comes through a person who has it in his power to know their intended operations." Forman also forwarded Loyalist newspapers from New York as a source of intelligence. The uneven pace of Forman’s intelligence frustrated Washington at times. In November, Washington wrote Marquis De Vaudriel, "I cannot account for not hearing from General Forman (upon the Monmouth Coast) respecting the sailing of the last division and fleet." Washington was apparently embarrassed that a British fleet sailed from Sandy Hook without a report from Forman (the report arrived a few days later). On December 12, Washington wrote Forman to politely ask him to be more prompt in sending intelligence reports. On receiving this rebuke, perhaps not coincidentally, Forman wrote Washington of a serious blow to his intelligence network: My intelligence from New York has of late been entirely broken up, occasioned by a fellow from this county joining the enemy & swearing against eight different persons - they went to New York by my permission. But this breakdown did not prevent Forman from declaring Staten Island "very defenseless" based on reports from one of his intelligencers. At this time, Forman also forward his accounts for 1780-1781 related to maintaining his intelligence network. He apologized for needing to send a bill for reimbursement but said that he was "drained to the last shilling.” Despite this, there is evidence that Forman maintained at least some “intelligencers” in New York late into 1782 when Washington again promised Forman funds to maintain his "chain of intelligence” in New York. Later Intrigues in New York In February 1782, Forman sought permission to send Ana Prevost to New York to collect a debt owed to her family by David Matthews, the Loyalist Mayor of New York. Matthews was hated by local Whigs because of his role in administering the miserable British prisons in which hundreds of Americans died. Forman sought permission from Washington, who referred him to Governor William Livingston. Livingston declined to grant permission and sent him back to Washington. On his second try to get a pass for Prevost, Forman discussed sending Prevost for spying purposes: “I should not have interested myself so considerably had I not the fullest assurance of being able to obtain the fullest account of the enemy's situation... also to establish a line of intelligence." On March 8, Governor Livingston finally approved Forman's plan. This is the subject of another article. A few months later, David Forman, with two former legislators, John Covenhoven and Thomas Henderson, proposed a plan to extract specie from New York by sending “a person of prominence” to New York to borrow from Loyalist creditors, receive specie, and never pay the loan because of the impending evacuation of New York. Forman and his colleagues acknowledged that the plan was “hazardous business” but argued it was necessary because of a lack of specie in the state. The plan to extract specie through unpaid loans was neither approved nor disapproved by the Governor, but was likely put into effect. It is probable that Forman, himself, was the “person of prominence.” In April 1783, Elias Boudinot wrote, "Mr. [David] Forman is in New York" without stating the reason that Forman was behind enemy lines. Perspective David Forman was not the only Revolutionary leader who sought to extract intelligence from New York. For example, in July 1780, Colonel Elias Dayton proposed a plan to learn of British defenses by embedding a boat with trusted men "to follow the fishing [boats] to Sandy Hook until he gets thorough knowledge of every obstruction in the Narrows and then return to Elizabethtown." Other New Jerseyans implemented other plans. But, in total, and despite his inconsistent record, no individual was as prolific as David Forman in providing intelligence about the enemy. Related Historic Site : Washington-Rochambeau Revolutionary Route Sources : Sullivan, John, Letters and Papers of Major John Sullivan, Otis G. Hammond, ed. , 2 vols. (Concord, NH: 1930-31) vol. 2, pp. 355-6; Elias Boudinot Letterbook, Wisconsin Historical Society, p95; John Burrowes to Lord Stirling, Library of Congress, George Washington Papers, series 4, reel 58, May 6, 1779; Benjamin Ford to George Washington, Library of Congress, George Washington Papers, http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=mgw4&fileName=gwpage058.db&recNum=1102&tempFile=./temp/~ammem_YHA1&filecode=mgw&next_filecode=mgw&prev_filecode=mgw&itemnum=7&ndocs=100 ; George Washington from David Forman, 21 July 1780,” Founders Online, National Archives (http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-02-02593), ver. 2013-09-28; David Forman to Nathaniel Scudder and Thomas Henderson, New Jersey State Archives, Collective Series, Revolutionary War Documents, #102; David Forman to George Washington, Library of Congress, George Washington Papers, series 4, reel 72, July 23, 1781; David Forman to George Washington, Library of Congress, George Washington Papers, series 4, reel 80, September 5, 1781; David Forman to George Washington, Library of Congress, George Washington Papers, series 4, reel 81, October 17-19, 1781; Library of Congress, George Washington Papers, http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/P?mgw:28:./temp/~ammem_8Jit ::; Burke Davis, The Campaign that Won America (New York: The Dial Press, 1970), pp. 30; George Washington to Marquis Vaudreil, John Fitzpatrick, ed., The Writings of George Washington from the Original Manuscript Sources (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1932) vol. 24, pp. 382-3; David Forman to George Washington, Library of Congress, George Washington Papers, series 4, reel 87, September 1 and 3, 1782; David Forman, Thomas Henderson, and John Covenhoven to William Livingston, Carl Prince, Papers of William Livingston (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1987) vol. 4, pp. 440-1; George Washington to David Forman, John Fitzpatrick, ed., The Writings of George Washington from the Original Manuscript Sources (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1932) vol. 24, pp. 60, 320; George Washington to Anne-César, chevalier de La Luzerne, 6 November 1782,” Founders Online, National Archives (http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-02-09886, ver. 2013-09-28); Paul Smith, et al, Letters of Delegates to Congress, 1774–1789 (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1970) vol. 20, pp 201-2; Monmouth County Historical Association, Diaries Collection, box 2, John Stillwell's Diary (photocopy); George Washington to David Forman, John Fitzpatrick, ed., The Writings of George Washington from the Original Manuscript Sources (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1932) vol. 23, pp. 424-5; Monmouth County Historical Association, Diaries Collection, box 2, John Stillwell's Diary (photocopy). 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The articles in the collection 250 for the 250th: The American Revolution in Monmouth County represent the most complete history of this topic ever assembled. < 250 Home < Previous pg. Next > David Forman and the Continental Army Red Coats by Michael Adelberg Re-enactors in the blue-coated uniforms of the 3rd New Jersey Continental Regiment. David Forman’s Monmouth County regiment, in contrast, wore red coats taken from the British. - April 1777 - The Continental Army was faced with many problems, particularly early in the war. Among them was the inability to provide uniforms to its troops. When David Forman started raising his Additional Regiment of the Continental Army in January 1777, there were no uniforms available. George Washington was aware that Forman’s men needed uniforms. On April 17, he wrote James Mease, the Army’s Clothier General, about “a sufficient quantity [of uniforms] for Colo. Forman's Regiment of which they are in immediate want.” But the uniforms that were available were thick wool and ill-suited for the spring. Washington “directed the Colo. to have the heavy woolen linings taken out of the Coats… as they will be too warm for summer.” What is most interesting about these uniforms is that they were red; they had been taken from the British Army. David Forman’s regiment would be unformed as British soldiers. This concerned George Washington, who instructed his aide, George Johnston, to write Forman on May 9: "His Excellency conceives of the disadvantages and dangers that must attend our troops being clothed in scarlet; desires that you would have those drawn dyed some other color." Forman’s men spent the summer of 1777 in a salt marsh near on the shore building a salt works co-owned by their Colonel. The men grew sick and lacked provisions. Desertions resulted. In July and August 1777, two Pennsylvania newspapers advertised desertions from David Forman's Additional Regiment. One noted the deserter was in a uniform described as "scarlet and buff with pewter buttons." The second newspaper account described the deserter's uniform as "red coat with buff-colored facings, with woolen jacket, buff breeches and wool hat cocked up." A shore resident and militiaman, Samuel Lippincott, recalled meeting Captain John Burrowes of Forman’s regiment "who commanded a company which were termed Red Coats from the color of their outer garments." Forman’s red-coated Continentals participated in the Battle of Germantown , where Colonel Asher Holmes, leading the Monmouth militia, referred to them as “the Red Coats under Gen. Forman.” General Alexander MacDougall of the Continental Army also described that “Forman's Red Coats stood firm and advanced upon the British Red Coats." It is known that the Battle of Germantown was fought in poor visibility (due to fog and smoke from gunpowder filling the air). The Continental Army held firm at first, but broke lines amidst confusion about British positions. There was friendly fire between Continental units. Koert Schenck of Monmouth County recalled that Forman’s men “who all wore red coats and were fired at by some of our troops by mistake.” The origin of these uniforms is briefly discussed by Rachel Henderson, wife of Dr. Thomas Henderson, a friend of Forman’s. In a statement provided in Daniel Applegate’s postwar veteran’s pension, she wrote of Forman’s regiment “in regular uniform red coats, the said red coats having been taken by the Militia of Monmouth County from a British vessel captured in Raritan Bay.” Henderson’s account is corroborated by Abraham Melat’s testimony in his postwar veteran’s pension application: He was with a number of others, marched to Freehold and then put under the command of Col David Forman & company, consisting of about 30 under the command of Capt. John Burrowes, marched to the Monmouth shore to protect it, while there, a British vessel was wrecked, from which he took a large quantity of clothing and all the company, when he returned to headquarters were dressed in clothes we took from the British ship. Finally, Daniel Hygate’s testimony in Thomas Henderson’s pension application further corroborates that Forman’s regiment wore uniforms taken from the British: "said men raised & under drill & in regular uniforms, in red coats, the said red coats having been taken by the militia of Monmouth County from a British vessel captured in Raritan Bay." It is also known that David Forman used his own money to clothe his men. On March 1, 1778, as Forman was losing command of his regiment as a result of a dispute with the New Jersey Legislature , he submitted a £467 bill for clothing them over the course of "18 days of purchasing." The Continental Army’s account books also list $10,000 owed Forman in December 1778 for expenses incurred for equipping and clothing his men. As late as 1781, the New Jersey State Treasurer was carrying a line item for £961 in bounties and clothing expenses owed to Forman for his Additional Regiment. It is unknown whether Forman had to purchase the captured British uniforms for his men or if the uniforms were condemned to him as a prize of war with the captured vessel. Either way, Forman faced additional expenses in clothing his men beyond their uniforms. For example, shoes were an expensive necessity also in short supply. It is a fascinating irony that the regiment of Continentals raised to defend Monmouth County from British attacks wore British uniforms. This serves as a good reminder that the early Continental Army was truly a threadbare operation. Related Historic Site : Cliveden (The Chew House) Sources : Geore Washington to James Mease, John Fitzpatrick, The Writings of George Washington, US Govt Printing Office, Washington DC, 1932, vol 7, 420-2; George Johnson to David Forman, Neilson Family Papers, box 1, folder: Rutgersania, Rutgers University Special Collections Charles Lefferts, Uniforms of American, British, French & German Armies in the Revolution (New York: 1926) p 78; Asher Holmes, Letter Concerning the Battle at Germantown, 1777, Proceedings of the NJHS, vol 7, 1922, p34-5; New Jersey State Archives, Dept. of Treasury, Auditor's Acct. Books, Book B, Ledger A, reel 181, #35-6; Account List, Clothier General, National Archives, Papers of the Continental Congress, M247, I59, Miscellaneous Papers, v 2, p 143; Thomas Henderson (W426), Forman’s Regiment and Monmouth County militia, Supplementary deposition of Daniel Applegate, 21 April 1837, transcribed by John U. Rees; Forman, Samuel S. Narrative of a Journey down the Ohio and Mississippi in 1789-90 (Cincinnati, R. Clarke and Co., 1888) p 9-10. Franklin Ellis, The History of Monmouth County (R.T. Peck: Philadelphia, 1885), p 735; National Archives, revolutionary War veterans Pension Applications, New Jersey - Samuel Lippincott; National Archives, Revolutionary War Veterans' Pension Application, Abraham Melat of Mercer Co, www.fold3.com/image/#23397176 ; National Archives, Revolutionary War Veterans' Pension Application, Thomas Henderson of New Jersey, www.fold3.com/image/#23877525 The Library Company, New Jersey Votes of the Assembly, June 1781, p 71-72. Previous Next

The articles in the collection 250 for the 250th: The American Revolution in Monmouth County represent the most complete history of this topic ever assembled. < 250 Home < Previous pg. Next > Winter Storms Drive Five Ships onto Monmouth Shore by Michael Adelberg Christopher Marshall of Philadelphia was one of a few men who wrote about the powerful storms that hit New Jersey in January 1780. Five British vessels were driven ashore during the storms. - January 1780 - As noted in prior articles, the British naval presence around New York City and Sandy Hook weakened so much in 1779 that privateers were able to prowl the sea-lanes to Sandy Hook with impunity and Continental Army parties under Captain John Burrowes and Major Henry “Light Horse Harry” Lee were able to raid Sandy Hook without reprisal. In addition, the weakened British navy was unable to rescue British and Loyalist ships when they stranded on shore—a risk made worse by winter. On December 30, Monmouth Militia captured the Loyalist brig, Britannia , near present-day Keansburg after it broke anchor at Sandy Hook and was driven ashore near present-day Keansburg. Storms on January 6 and 12, 1780, would lead to four additional captures. Shipwrecks from the January 6 Storm A large storm on January 6 resulted in the capture of at least two vessels along Monmouth County’s shores. The American Journal of Providence, Rhode Island, reported about the January 6 storm on February 1. The newspaper reported: We are informed that in the late snow storm, a large copper-bottomed brig of 20 guns and 120 men, belonging to the enemy, was drove ashore near Middletown Point, and about 80 of the men were taken prisoners, the rest having escaped in a boat; and that 20 hogshead of rum and 4 pipes of wine were found on board her. A British shore ship was also driven a shore at the same time. The report suggested that a total of 40 British and Loyalists ships were rumored to have washed ashore along the New Jersey and New York coastlines during the same storm. On January 10, Philadelphia's Christopher Marshall recorded on two shipwrecks on the Monmouth shore from the same storm: A twenty four gun frigate in the last storm was lost off Middletown Point near Shrewsbury, and crews of which mostly escaped in boats to New York, [also] the forty gun ship was drive ashore near Egg Harbor; one hundred crew was found dead aboard, the remainder, sixty in number, where happily relieved. Shipwrecks from the January 12 Storm The Providence and Virginia Gazette s both reported on the January 12 storm. They carried identical reports written the day of the storm: We have had accounts of vessels being drove ashore along the seacoast, in the late severe gales; but cannot find that any of them are to be depended upon, except that a brig of 12 guns, belonging to the enemy, is ashore near South Amboy, and a ship of 20 guns at Squan. Colonel Lewis Nicola, at Egg Harbor, reported to Congress on January 16 about a third ship lost day: "It was reported that a 40 gun ship was said to be lost off Egg Harbor, supposed to be the Romley as she was said to be last of the fleet that went with Genl. Clinton on board." Also on January 12, amidst the storm, Captain Peyton of Lee’s cavalry crossed the frozen Sandy Hook Bay in sleighs to raid the British base at Sandy Hook. The 40-man party achieved total surprise: capturing several men and $45,000 in counterfeit money at a house on Sandy Hook. They then burned three small ships before departing without any losses. This is the subject of another article . The British Response The British did not pursue Peyton’s raiders or seek to rescue any of the five vessels lost during the January the two storms. The British naval presence in New York City at this time is unknown, but it was likely underwhelming, as it was known that a British squadron had left the area in early January. The prominent Loyalist, William Smith, of New York wrote, with displeasure, on January 14 that "we hear of [privateer] vessels, some times 2 or 8, and once 13, appearing off the Hook, and going away again towards nights end." Smith noted that the iced-in British naval vessels were unable to pursue. The non-response to the ships lost on January 6 and January 12, as well as the non-responses to Peyton’s raid on Sandy Hook, and the continued privateer provocations just outside of Sandy Hook demonstrate the weakness of the British navy forces in January 1780. It also demonstrates a surprising lack of preparation by the British for the severe cold weather that iced-in their few ships. Even before reaching their nadir of power in January, it was understood that the British were much weaker. In October 1779, Colonel David Forman of Manalapan, who periodically went to the Navesink Highlands to observe the British navy at Sandy Hook, wrote "they are reduced to a position more to be pitied than feared." This is a stunning reversal considering that just two years earlier, British forces on the heavily fortified Sandy Hook (bristling with a dozen warships, a shore battery, fireships, and 1,500 troops) had faced down a massive French fleet that had sailed the Atlantic specifically to enter Sandy Hook. Related Historic Site : New Jersey Shipwreck Museum Sources : American Journal (Providence), February 10, 1780; Christopher Marshall, The Diary of Christopher Marshall (Amazon Digital Services, 2014) p 235; Virginia Gazette, January 29, 1780; Providence Gazette, February 12, 1780; Lewis Nicola to Congress, National Archives, Papers of the Continental Congress, reel 187, item 169, #191; Lewis Nicola to Congress, National Archives, Papers of the Continental Congress, M247, I63, Letters from General & Other Officers, p 188; William Smith, Historical Memoirs of William Smith: From 26 August 1778 to 12 November 1783 (New York: Arno, 1971) p 214; David Forman is quoted in Nathanael Greene, The Papers of General Nathanael Greene (Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina Press, 1976) vol. 4, p 428. Previous Next

The articles in the collection 250 for the 250th: The American Revolution in Monmouth County represent the most complete history of this topic ever assembled. < 250 Home < Previous pg. Next > Crackdown on Militia Delinquents in Shrewsbury Township by Michael Adelberg By summer 1780, Monmouth militia was regularly skirmishing with Loyalist raiders. In parts of the county with poor militia turnout, officers cracked down on delinquents with massive fines. - August 1780 - Prior articles show how Monmouth County’s local war grew especially desperate in summer 1780. Irregular Loyalist raiding parties, such as the Black Brigade , penetrated the county’s shores and took off a dozen militia officers and many other leaders. Monmouth Countians, largely unable to attack enemies shielded behind British lines, set their sights on internal enemies instead. The Retaliators , a vigilante society, practiced eye-for-an-eye retaliation, mostly against the kin of Loyalists rather than actual Loyalists. Continental soldiers took 160 head of livestock from people living near the shore based on alleged or past disaffection outside of the legal system. Militia service was compulsory in Revolutionary New Jersey. So, the same men judged disaffected (and punished for it) were also required to serve in the militia. In Monmouth County’s three Atlantic shore townships—Shrewsbury, Dover, and Stafford—many men skipped militia duty ; some likely did not serve at all. Documentation is best for Shrewsbury Township where the original militia Colonel, Samuel Breese, resigned due to the “backwardness ” of locals who “secreted” themselves in order to avoid serving. Several shore township militia companies were unreliable long into the war. Frustration with militia delinquents was expressed throughout the war. A May 1779 Monmouth County petition noted the suffering of Whigs (supporters of the Revolution) and then discussed militia delinquents: Many of the inhabitants capable of bearing arms who refuse to turn out with their neighbors, possess the common enemy, have by staying at home injured both persons and estates. Now they are subject to only a trifling punishment, whilst they that obeyed their Country's call not only hazard their lives but have lost almost their whole estates. The petitioners called for “just relief” without specifying what it might be. There are a few surviving documents showing “trifling” fines for militia delinquency in 1778. See table 12 a . If these returns are typical, delinquency rates commonly ranged between 15 and 45 percent. The New Jersey Legislature was aware of poor militia turnout in parts of the state and the desire to more strictly punish delinquents. It was also aware of difficulties raising men for the Continental Army . To address both problems, the legislature nearly passed a law in March 1780 that would require delinquents to serve a year in the Army. In June, it passed a milder law that required six months of army service for delinquents. The law would sunset in a year unless re-passed. Historian Mark Lender wrote about the law, and noted that it only raised 200 men for the Army—a small fraction of the state’s militia delinquents. Militia officers were, it appears, reluctant to cooperate with the Army to identify and gather up delinquents. The New Jersey Assembly received several protests against the law, including one from the Shrewsbury Quaker Meeting. Their petition set forth “that the militia bill now in force, more especially that passed sixteenth day of June last, proves very grievous in the manner they have been executed against some of the persons belonging to the meeting." The law was not renewed. Meanwhile, Monmouth County militia leaders started taking a tougher stand against militia delinquency. In June 1780, the Middletown militia company of Captain Barnes Smock (recently captured ) identified sixteen delinquents, including Lt. Tunis Vanderveer and Stephen Seabrook (bayoneted three years earlier in a Loyalist raid ). Interestingly, the men were fined £10 rather than $50. The conversion of the fines from inflationary dollars to stable pre-war pounds suggests that the June 1780 fine was more considerable than prior fines. £10 was roughly half the value of a good horse. In July, Captain Daniel Hampton listed 23 delinquents from his company, but the fine amount is not listed. On August 4, Captain Thomas Bennett wrote his Colonel (Daniel Hendrickson, leading the Shrewsbury militia) about "being unable to come at this time with my return, am under the necessity of writing to you and sending my return." Bennett also wrote about some men in his company: Thomas Truax "has been unable for some months past to do any work and consequently unfit for military duty" and "Philip Lewis's wife and William White's wife are both in a condition not to be left alone" so they were excused from service. Only fourteen of Bennett’s men were listed as "present and fit for duty." Two weeks later, an unnamed Middletown militia officer compiled, "A List of those of Warned on the Alarm of August 17, 1780, to march after Colo. Tye." Only two militiamen answered the alarm; sixteen were delinquent. A week after that, Governor William Livingston wrote Colonel Hendrickson: I cannot observe but with great concern that of 27 men lately called from your Regiment to rendezvous at this place [Morristown] by the first of this month, not one of them have appeared, and I should now order them to be immediately detached. Hendrickson was further ordered to prepare 27 more men for deployment the following month. Crackdown on Militia Delinquents in Shrewsbury Township The reprimand from the Governor ignited a crackdown on militia delinquency in Shrewsbury Township. Hendrickson started convening courts-martial for militia delinquency at the inn of Lydia West in Colts Neck. Colts Neck was the furthest inland and safest village in the township, but even with this, a Loyalist raiding party attacked Colts Neck as the courts-martial were being held. The court’s five officers Capt. Stephen Fleming, Lt. Jacob Fleming, Lt. Ephraim Buck, Lt. Hendrick Vanderveer, Lt. Hendrick Van Brunt, were not, however, endangered by Loyalist raiders at this time. Documentation on the courts-martial is confusing, but at least two courts were held at West’s tavern in late August. The first one fined 25 men from Captain James Green’s company a total of £7,115. Five men were fined £500, the largest amount. Other men were fined as little as £5. No document explains this variation but it is probable that fine size was impacted by the length of the delinquency (an entire month vs. a day) and by individual circumstance. It is also possible that alleged acts of disaffection or the acts of Loyalist kin may have increased the size of the militia fine. A second court fined 32 additional men on August 31, with the largest fines of £500 being imposed upon six men. However, another document dated August 31, lists 135 men fined for delinquency across the entire regiment. This document notes that officers were "commanded to levy on the goods & chattels of the several delinquents... and dispose of said goods and chattels by way of public vendue." The crackdown continued in September. Another court martial at West’s tavern occurred on October 4 (for delinquencies in September). Fourteen men were fined £2,346. The largest fine was again £500. Attention shifted to collecting fines. According to a list of "Warrants Granted for the Collection" of militia delinquency fines, a staggering £38,429 (approximately the value of twenty mid-sized estates) was owed by Shrewsbury militia delinquents. Fine collectors were selected for each of Shrewsbury’s eight militia companies. Table 12b shows the collectors for each company. The table reveals strains in the Shrewsbury militia. Only three of the August collectors were collectors for the same company in September. One company had no collector in August. Two companies had no captain in August and one captaincy remained vacant in September. By September, three collectors were serving for two companies each. Given the flux, it is improbable that fine collection went well. Adding to the militia’s woes was a profound lack of ammunition . An October appeal to the New Jersey Assembly complained that there were only four dozen cartridges for the entire Shrewsbury regiment—though the state did send more war materials in November. It is easy to imagine that collectors were reluctant to go into some neighborhoods and that many delinquents were uncooperative. At least once, a militiaman was fined in error. Daniel Covenhoven of Middletown was a good militiaman who was captured and jailed for a year and a half in New York. He was paroled home in January 1781. As a condition of his parole, he was not allowed to serve, but was fined nonetheless. He wrote Governor Livingston in protest: My circumstances will not permit me to turn out in the militia, being now upon my parole, as the enclosed deposition will show, and having been fined by the Court Martial for refusal upon sd principles, I would appeal to your Excellency for redress. Existing documents do not reveal how much of the massive fine total was ever collected. A “return of delinquents” compiled in November 1780 for the Middletown militia company of Capt. William Schenck lists eight delinquents. They were only fined £10 each. It is unknown why the largest Shrewsbury militia fines were 50 times that amount. Because no returns exist from militia companies outside of Shrewsbury for the months of August and September, it is impossible to know if the massive fines of the Shrewsbury regiment were mirrored in the other two regiments. State Law Improves Punishments for Militia Delinquents In January 1781, the New Jersey Legislature considered uncollected militia delinquency fines. Minutes from their deliberations note that Monmouth County was specifically discussed: "the County of Monmouth shall on account of its present circumstances have one common treasurer to the three regiments, to be appointed by the officers of the said regiments jointly." Following deliberations, the legislature passed a law to enhance fine collection. The law is summarized below: Sergeants of each company were required to go to the homes of militiamen and determine that each man had arms to attend the militia. Arms would be made available to men lacking arms. Once supplied, men would unable to skip service due to lack of arms; To encourage greater militia participation, half of all collected militia fines would be distributed as a bounty to men who attend the militia muster; Four days a year, there would be a general muster of all militia companies (first day of April, June, September, November) for completing a muster roll and inspection of the men; Regimental colonels were required to file bi-annual reports on the condition of their regiments; Every militia delinquent was ordered to appear before a local magistrate to pays fines or arrange a schedule for paying fines. The new law, by bringing magistrates into the process, likely regularized the collection of fines. Militia delinquents faced consequences for repeated delinquency. On January 14, 1782, an auction was held to pay the delinquency fines of Peter Hulsart, a tailor from Freehold. The auction notice read: Give notice that there will be sold on Thursday, the fourteenth of January next, at two o'clock in the afternoon at the house of William Mount, a cow and a bed, it being for fines as delinquent of Lt Hendrick Vanderveer's company, who did not turn out for his monthly tour of duty. A second auction in July 1782 was held against Hulsart to auction off "horse and horned cattle” to pay off his additional militia delinquency fines. In May 1782, Sheriff (and militia officer) John Burrowes deputized John North to collect militia delinquency fines from sixteen men: "You are hereby empowered to collect upon my company for not turning out in monthly duty April last.” The largest fine was £20 and a second fine was £15. The other men were fined £10 or less. In August 1782, Colonel Samuel Forman ordered Captain John Covenhoven to call out two classes of Dover militia. Forman noted upcoming court martials under Captain Samuel Brown to fine militia delinquents. He warned Covenhoven that disaffected shore residents would quit the militia camp if not watched by an officer: "Never let such a thing be known at night again, as the men will go and return for want of an officer." He also warned that Colonel Asher Holmes, the senior colonel for the county, was insisting on the collection of militia delinquency fines: Col Holmes is now on his command, that now comes under his direction, do press the collecting of the money from the militiamen. I am drummed hard. Don't forget last year's money, I really want that too & it ought to be doubled. Militia delinquency was a complicated problem. If delinquency fines were “trifling” or not collected, more delinquency would result. If the fines were draconian, resentments against the new government would grow. After being too lax, militia fines were clearly too draconian in August 1780. It is not a coincidence that the shift to draconian fines coincided with the rise of the Retaliators, the vigilante society. The same desperate circumstances that drove people to mete out punishing fines led other men to embrace vigilantism. The 1781 state law may have created a reasonable path for addressing militia delinquency—but delinquency persisted through the end of the war. Related Historic Site : Captain Joshua Huddy’s Homestead and Marker Sources : Petition, Monmouth County Historical Association, J. Amory Haskell Collection, folder 22, Document A; List of Militia Delinquents, Monmouth County Historical Association, Cherry Hall Papers, box 15, folder 7; List of Militia Delinquents, Monmouth County Historical Association, Cherry Hall Papers, box 6, folder 6; Captain Stephen Fleming, Muster Roll, New Jersey Historical Society, Holmes Family Papers, box 5, folder 6; Mark Lender, “The Enlisted Line: The Continental Soldiers of New Jersey”(Ph.D. diss., Rutgers University, 1975) p 90; Muster Roll, National Archives, Collection 881, R 593, 640. Barnes Smock, Muster Roll, National Archives, Collection 881, R 593, 640; Captain Daniel Hampton, Militia Return, New Jersey Historical Society, Holmes Family Papers, box 5, folder 4; Thomas Bennett to Daniel Hendrickson, New Jersey Historical Society, Holmes Family Papers, box 5, folder 4; “A List of Those Warned Out…”, New Jersey Historical Society, Holmes Family Papers, box 4, folder 2; William Livingston to Daniel Hendrickson, New Jersey State Archives, William Livingston Papers, reel 11, August 29, 1780; List of Militia Delinquents, New Jersey Historical Society, Holmes Family Papers, box 5, folder 5; Militia Court Martial List, New Jersey Historical Society, Holmes Family Papers, box 5, folder 5; Militia Court Martials, Holmes Family Papers, Revolutionary War Series, Court Martials, New Jersey Historical Society; Warrants Granted for the Collection of Fines, Holmes Family Papers, Revolutionary War Series, New Jersey Historical Society; The Library Company, New Jersey Votes of the Assembly, November 8, 1780, p 20-21; Return of Delinquents, National Archives, Revolutionary War Rolls, New Jersey, folder 58, #122; Discussion of militia delinquency fines are in Anderson, John R. "Militia Law in Revolutionary New Jersey." Proceedings of the New Jersey historical Society, vols. LXXVI and LXXVII (July 1956 and January 1959), p 14; Daniel Covenhoven to William Livingston, New Jersey State Archives, William Livingston Papers, reel 14, February 15, 1781; New Jersey’s 1781 militia law is discussed in Anderson, John R. "Militia Law in Revolutionary New Jersey." Proceedings of the New Jersey historical Society, vols. LXXVI and LXXVII (July 1956 and January 1959), pp. 16-8; Auction Advertisements, Rutgers University Special Collections, Holsart Family Papers, folder: A2; John Burrowes to John North, Monmouth County Historical Association, J. Amory Haskell Collection, folder 12, Document M; Samuel Forman to Captain John Covenhoven, National Archives, Collection 881, R 640. Previous Next

The articles in the collection 250 for the 250th: The American Revolution in Monmouth County represent the most complete history of this topic ever assembled. < 250 Home < Previous pg. Next > Joshua Huddy's State Troops Stationed at Toms River by Michael Adelberg In February 1782, twenty State Troops went to Toms River to defend the village. They lacked provisions and their small fort, the Block House, lacked cannon. Loyalists would defeat them in March. - January 1782 - As discussed in prior articles, by 1781, much of Dover and Stafford townships in southern Monmouth County (present-day Ocean County) was disaffected by 1780—to the point that they were electing disaffected men into important local offices. Shore residents were tied into a profitable illegal trade between Monmouth County and British buyers at Sandy Hook and New York, the so-called London Trade. Active Loyalist irregulars, confederated into Pine Robber gangs allied with London Traders. The most prominent Whig enclave on the Monmouth shore (Whigs were people who supported the Revolution) was the port village of Toms River. The village and its port were tied into a privateering economy built on New England and Philadelphia vessels preying on British shipping going to and from New York. Privateers used Toms River to provision their ships and deposit prize vessels. In late 1780, residents of Toms River petitioned for a guard to help protect the village; a 30-man company of New Jersey State Troops under Lieutenant David Imlay was stationed there for a year, and then renewed for a second year. Throughout 1781, Pine Robber gangs in Stafford Township and Little Egg Harbor Township (in neighboring Burlington County) grew bolder. They routed the Stafford Township militia at Manahawkin in early December. In Toms River, locals were convinced that these Pine Robbers—25 miles to the south—posed a dire threat to the village. They sent a series of letters and petitions to Governor William Livingston and New Jersey legislators complaining of their danger. A December 10 petition signed by the leaders of Toms River and several county militia officers called for a new State Troop guard under Captain Joshua Huddy to protect Toms River: It was necessary for the protection of the good citizens of this State that a guard, consisting of twenty-five men, should be stationed at Toms River, and as the time of the present guard is nearly expired, we recommend to your Excellency and Honors Captain Joshua Huddy as a proper person to raise & command a guard to succeed the present, for the ensuing year. Huddy was a controversial figure in Monmouth County. On the one hand, he was a strong supporter of the Revolution and a brave soldier. In 1777, he raised a State Troops artillery company that marched from Colts Neck to Pennsylvania to fight at the Battle of Germantown . During the Battle of Monmouth, Huddy led a brash (and doomed) cavalry attack on the British baggage train. Huddy was also one of several Monmouth County officers who tried his hand at privateering , and managed a tavern at Colts Neck at a time when the village was the center of a campaign to crackdown on militia delinquents . On the other hand, Huddy had a knack for trouble. In 1779, he had a falling out with his wife, Catherine Hart (born Catherine Applegate), that resulted in his having to post an extraordinary bond of £15,000, to be cashed if he sold off any of her possessions. He had also cast out Catherine’s children "by means of threats or blows" and prevented the children "from living & continuing with him, the said Joshua, and Catherine." Huddy was hated by Loyalists for his role in the extra-legal hanging of the captured Loyalist, Stephen Edwards. He was also twice convicted of assault in the Monmouth County courts and was a frequent litigant for other reasons. Huddy was involved in the impressment and confiscation of goods from disaffected Monmouth Countians and joined the Association for Retaliation , a vigilante society established in July 1780. In August 1780, Huddy was the target of a Loyalist raid that temporarily captured him. The raiders were pursued by militia to Rumson, where a skirmish ensued as the raiders were loading themselves and their booty onto boats. Huddy was shot in the thigh (likely friendly fire), but was still able to swim to shore and narrowly escape capture. Raising Huddy’s Toms River Guard Out of respect for the concerns raised from Toms River residents, the New Jersey Legislature approved re-raising a company of State Troops for the defense of Toms River, with service to begin on January 1, 1782. As before, Asher Holmes would be the Colonel of the larger state troop regiment for all of Monmouth County. The captain of record would be John Walton, based in far-off Freehold Township. Huddy, through previously a captain, was now commissioned a Lieutenant reporting to Walton. Recruiting was slow—the regiment raised only 11 enlisted men in January—42 more men in February and 13 more men in March. Half the men were from Freehold Township—the home of Holmes and Walton. A third of the recruits were 21 years old or younger. It appears that Huddy arrived at Toms River with his guard sometime in February. A February 28 troop return provides information on the State Troops guarding Toms River. Nine of Huddy’s men enlisted in January, ten more enlisted in February. One man, William Case, had a term to begin on March 1. The guard was five men short of its full complement. The term of enlistment for all of the men ran through December 15. Problems with Huddy’s Company The State Troops were short on supplies, prompting Walton to complain to Azariah Dunham, the commissary officer for New Jersey, on March 10. Walton wrote that his men and militia responding to alarms (including a February raid against Pleasant Valley) "have some time past been without the rations due them.” Walton continued: There will be a great need of your Honor or some other Gentlemen to come down [to Monmouth to purchase provisions], whom you should appoint to fix someone to contract for us, as Mr. [John] Lloyd has been contracting for some time past without any orders from you, and says he has no money in hand. Dunham arrived at Freehold on March 19 and sought to hire John Covenhoven or Thomas Henderson as the new county contractor to replace Lloyd. Dunham acknowledged the low wages paid to the contractor but appealed to Covenhoven and Henderson’s sense of patriotism as the “militia and troops are now destitute." Covenhoven and Henderson acknowledged “our peculiar and dangerous situation,” but declined to serve as the county’s contractor for supplying the troops. They concluded: We would therefore request that you contract with some person of reputation in the county (if you can) to supply the troops and militia on the best terms that you can until the meeting of the legislature in order to save the county from ruin by the incursions of the enemy. In March 1782, Huddy’s guard at Toms River was undersized and lacking provisions. The men had only been together for a few weeks and their training and discipline was likely minimal. The State Troops had constructed a small fort (called “the block house”) to defend Toms River, but the emplacements for small artillery were empty. They were led by a brave but rash officer who was despised by the enemy. Huddy was so notorious to the enemy that his presence at Toms River might have drawn the attention of vengeful Loyalist leaders with the ability to direct raids. On March 24, a 100-man party of Associated Loyalists attacked Toms River . They likely outnumbered the State Troops and local militia by two-to-one. The Loyalists were also guided by William Dillon, a local boatman with a long list of grievances against the residents of Toms River. The Loyalists overwhelmed the State Troops, captured Huddy and many of his men, and razed the village. The attack on Toms River is the subject of another article, as is the terrible fate that befell Huddy after his capture. Related Historic Site : Joshua Huddy Park Sources : Monmouth County Petition, December 10, 1781, Library of Congress, MMC - Monmouth, NJ - Oversize, cabinet 2, drawer 7; New Jersey State Archives, Dept. of Defense, Revolutionary War, Numbered Manuscripts, #3852, 3856A; Certificate, New Jersey State Archives, Dept. of Defense, Revolutionary War, Numbered Manuscripts, #5915; State Troop Return, National Archives, Collection 881, R 644; Joshua Huddy’s bond, Monmouth County Court of Common Pleas, Catalog of the Exhibition: Joshua Huddy and the American Revolution, Monmouth County Library Headquarters, October 2004John Walton to Azariah Dunham, Monmouth County Historical Association, Haskell Collection, box 1, folder 8; Azariah Dunham to Thomas Henderson and John Covenhoven, Monmouth County Historical Association, Haskell Collection, box 1, folder 8; Thomas Henderson and John Covenhoven to Azariah Dunham, in National Archives, Revolutionary War Veterans' Pension Application, Thomas Henderson of of NJ, www.fold3.com/image/#23877643 Previous Next

The articles in the collection 250 for the 250th: The American Revolution in Monmouth County represent the most complete history of this topic ever assembled. < 250 Home < Previous pg. Next > Local Pilots Advise French Fleet About Sandy Hook by Michael Adelberg This map shows the narrow channel that large ships needed to navigate to clear Sandy Hook. Local pilots advised the French that their ships sat too deep in the water to safely navigate the channel. - July 1778 - As noted in the prior article, a large French fleet anchored off Shrewsbury Inlet (which connected the Shrewsbury River to the ocean a few miles south of Sandy Hook) on July 11, 1778. The fleet’s admiral, Comte Charles Henri D’Estaing, knew he greatly outgunned the local British fleet, but he faced a problem. Crossing Sandy Hook to engage the British required navigating a narrow channel just north of the Hook. It was understood that the four largest French ships, each with more than 80 cannon—the same ones that gave them the firepower advantage to destroy the British fleet—would be unable to navigate the channel without local pilots who knew the waters. Sending Pilots to the French Fleet The Continental government knew the French needed pilots. Even before the French anchored on July 11, Samuel Cooper wrote of the first American pilot the fleet picked up (while in the Delaware Bay): A pilot taken from the Delaware had promised the Admiral that he would convey his Squadron into the middle of the harbour of Sandy Hook… But the doubts, the fears, the mistakes of the Pilot, before he had reached Sandy Hook, and finally his absolute refusal to perform what he had undertaken, threw the Count into an Embarrassment. Cooper further noted that local pilots living on the disaffected Shrewsbury shore did not come forward when the French anchored: “That part of the Jerseys has not the reputation of the greatest Zeal for the common cause.” Cooper concluded that “nothing presented itself to the squadron of our allies, unacquainted with our coasts, but an inaccessible Shore.” The first attempt to send a local pilot to the French was on July 12. Richard Westcott, a militia colonel at Egg Harbor, wrote Congress of receiving orders dated July 10. As a consequence of those orders, he "dispatched the Lexington privateer schooner, Capt. Cook [John Cook], with them." John Cook was a militia officer from Toms River who presumably knew the Monmouth shore and Sandy Hook well. George Washington, on receiving word of the French arrival, dispatched Colonel John Laurens to Shrewsbury to establish communications with the French and see to their needs. Washington asked Colonel David Forman, a Continental officer from Manalapan who had lost his command , to take “every measure in your power to facilitate Mr. Laurens getting on board the admiral's ship." Meanwhile, lacking pilots and provisions, D’Estaing took matters into his own hands. The Admiral landed inside Shrewsbury Inlet. He set up an outpost on Rumson Neck to procure provisions and establish contact with the Continental government. D’Estaing wrote Washington: The desire of communication speedily with your Excellency determines me to make a debarkation upon the coast of the Jersey in a village which, according to the map, is to the northwest of the river Shrewsbury. Washington received D’Estaing’s letter on July 14. He forwarded it to Congress, noting that "Count D'Estaing is off or near Sandy Hook, having already seized several fishing boats on the banks, in order to procure information and pilots." One of those pilots was apparently William Fundrum, a Loyalist, who would (likely correctly) counsel the French against attacking Sandy Hook. Washington sought pilots for the French and was led to Captain William Dobbs, living in New York state. Dobbs had been the resident pilot at Sandy Hook before the British took the Hook in April 1776. He wrote Dobbs on July 15: A considerable fleet of French men of War, chiefly Ships of the line, has just arrived at Sandy Hook, under the command of Admiral Count D'Estaing. As the Admiral is a Stranger to our Coast, and is come for the purpose of cooperating with us against the Enemy, it is absolutely necessary that he should be immediately provided with a number of skillful pilots, well acquainted with the Coast and Harbors and of firm attachment to our cause. Washington then asked Dobbs to immediately go to the French fleet: I would flatter myself you will not have the smallest objection to going on board the fleet on so essential and interesting an occasion. I will not at this time say anything of your pay, but I doubt not we shall readily agree on a sum that will not only be just but generous and if we should not, that your services will be liberally considered and rewarded by the States. Dobbs replied that he "should have immediately complied with the request - but that it met me on my sick bed." He suggested two other pilots. French officers with the Continental Army took note. Captain Choin was suspicious: “I am sorry to say… the pilot with the best reputation, under pretext of having a fever, he refused to board your ship." The Marquis de Lafayette was kinder, "regarding this pilot, he will try to get to your squadron as soon as his health will allow." Dobbs arrived in Shrewsbury on July 20. D'Estaing wrote Washington, "I thank you for the Captain... I will make use of him as soon as possible." Cook and other pilots were already on board. On July 16, Richard Henry Lee of the Continental Congress wrote D’Estaing about available fresh water and provisions at Toms River and Egg Harbor. Lee also noted that “the Pilots on board the fleet will conduct vessels sent for the purpose to either of these places.” Governor William Livingston was also seeking pilots. On July 16, he wrote Washington of his efforts “to forward pilots to the Hook to conduct the fleet.” Livingston noted that each French warship “ought at least to have one” pilot, but was doubtful he would find enough qualified pilots. He recommended three pilots living in New York to Washington Dobbs, Dennis McQuire, and Isaac Symondson. That same day, Alexander Hamilton, on behalf of George Washington, wrote to Captain Patrick Dennis of D’Estaing’s arrival and need for pilots: It is absolutely necessary that he should be attended by some Gentlemen of intelligence and who possess an accurate knowledge of the Coast and harbours. His Excellency General Washington from the information he has received is persuaded you answer this description in every part; and I am directed by him to request you in his name, if circumstances will permit, to go on board the Admiral as early as possible. For all the efforts, D’Estaing had only three pilots on July 18. He wrote Washington that the pilots were testing the entrance of the channel to see if it was deep enough for the largest French ships, "I have only three pilots yesterday; they have a need of recollecting their ideas and are at this time sounding the river." A disaffected fisherman, Samuel DeHart, informed the British about the pilots: "Captain Dobes [William Dobbs], Daniel Marlon, John Fise, Jeramia Tonkins are gone on board the French Fleet as Pilots.” DeHart was wrong about Dobbs—who had not yet arrived and he did not mention John Cook, who likely was piloting another French ship for provisions at Toms River or Egg Harbor at that time. The New York government was also seeking pilots. Jacobus Van Zandt wrote Governor George Clinton on July 19 on the need for pilots. Van Zandt was concerned by delays in sending Dobbs: “I beg your Excellency will send Maj. William Dobbs down to Black Point [Rumson]... Dobbs is a proper coasting and channel pilot." Van Zandt had been to Shrewsbury and delivered other pilots—”collected eight and delivered them.” He also had some harsh words about Shrewsbury and its residents, "I am much fatigued and almost burned up with hot sand in going through a villainous Tory country ." That same day, Captain Charles-René de Gras-Préville introduced eight newly-arrived pilots to Admiral D’Estaing. De Gras-Préville noted that General Washington and Governor Livingston had collected “as many Branch Pilots as Could be had in this State.” He described the experience of the pilots “four of which are the first Branch Pilots we had at New York before these Troubles, the other four are Men capable of carrying any Ship which draws less water than those under the Command of the Count.” All of the pilots “are Sufficiently acquainted to follow the largest Ships in the Channel.” By July 20, Alexander Hamilton was at Black Point. He wrote of establishing a chain of signal cannons that would fire to tell the Continental Army when the French started their attack. He also wrote that the French troops were sent to the area, so that a land attack could accompany the sea attack on the now fortified Sandy Hook peninsula. However, the French remained reliant on American pilots. Hamilton wrote, “Pilots will be a material article.” Pilots Advise Against Attack However, those same pilots on that same day advised D’Estaing that the largest French warships sat too deep in the water to navigate Sandy Hook’s channel. Hamilton wrote Washington again on July 20: "he [D'Estaing] has had the river sounded and finds he cannot enter, he will sail for Rhode Island." D’Estaing wrote twice about the counsel he received from the pilots. The key obstacle was an underwater sand bar at the front of the channel: The better pilots obtained and given to me by General Washington joined me. I encouraged them secretly and publicly by the promise of compensation. They only reiterated what we already knew -- it was necessary to take whatever presented itself, but not cross the bar. Later, he wrote: The pilot removed all hopes of crossing the bar. He observed that the French [ships of line] were three or four feet deeper in the water than English ships of the same class, and advised that the larger ships could not enter on the other side of the Hook, one would have to unload the ships and tow them. Conrad Alexandre Gerard, the French diplomat in Philadelphia, wrote comprehensively of the depth of the French ships vs. the depth of the channel. He suggested that the largest French warship might clear the channel by only one inch—an unacceptable margin of error: [The channel will] yield only a high sea depth of 23 feet 11 inches. The Languedoc’s draft is 22 feet six inches; that of the Tonnant is 23 feet 10 inches, and all the squadron’s 74-gun ships draw from 21 to 22 feet of water; they alone can have superiority over the 64 and fifty-gun ships that the English possess. The French warships could be unloaded to lighten them. Then they would sit higher in the water and have less risk of grounding when passing through the channel. But, of course, unloading the ships would mean removing their artillery and neutralizing their firepower. Heading into battle, this was not an option. This was apparently contrary to what the French were told while the fleet was still in Europe. Lt. Jean Julian LeMauff wrote that Americans “assured him [D’Estaing] in Europe that there was enough water there [at Sandy Hook] for his squadron to enter” and “fight the English.” However, when “the pilot having arrived [Dobbs], there was not enough water for the large ships of the line and even for those of 74 guns, he would not take charge of the squadron." In an unfortunate coincidence for the French, the same day that D’Estaing decided to sail his fleet away from Sandy Hook, July 22, the winds shifted and the water deepened at Sandy Hook. A British report published in the London Chronicle recorded: On the 22d everything seemed to favour Monsieur's project. A fresh easterly wind, of two days continuance, at a time when the spring tides were at the greatest height, raised the water on the bar very considerably higher than its common level. British officers at Sandy Hook witnessed the French ships weighing anchor at “the proper time of tide for allowing him [D’Estaing] to make a tack or two to get into a position for lying in over the bar at high water.” For a short time, the British prepared to “settle matters with the Count on that day.” However, “after tacking two or three times, he [D’Estaing] stood off to sea, and we have not seen the Gentleman since.” Perspective Were the pilots correct that the larger French ships, when loaded for battle, sat too deep in the water to take the channel into Sandy Hook? The first pilot to accompany the French, the unnamed man picked up in Delaware Bay, probably was unqualified to lead the fleet around Sandy Hook. He likely led their failed landing at the bottom of Sandy Hook on July 12. But there is no reason to think the other pilots were incorrect in their judgment. Continental Army Doctor, David Ramsey, who wrote one of the first narratives of the Revolutionary War, did not blame the pilots for the non-attack at Sandy Hook: American pilots of the first abilities, provided for the purpose, went on board his fleet. Among them were persons, whose circumstances placed them above the ordinary rank of pilots… The pilots on board the French fleet, declared it to be impossible to carry the large ships thereof over the bar, on account of their draught of water. Washington, though probably disappointed, trusted the counsel of the pilots. On July 26, four days after the French sailed for Rhode Island, he called Dobbs “a pilot of the first established reputation.” He further wrote: “The most experienced Pilots have been employed in sounding, and after the deepest consideration of what might be effected by lightening the Ships and the like, the attempt has been determined unadvisable." Three years later, British ships of the line, the same size as the largest French ships, would unload their cargoes in order to sail the channel Sandy Hook—an option not available to the French. However, narratives written in the 1800s labeled Dobbs and the other pilots “cowardly,” “timorous” or worse. A French writer, for example, wrote: “The American pilots, whose advice he [D’Estaing] took too much, whether from ignorance on their part, treason or cowardice, dissuaded him from this enterprise.” Someone had to be blamed for the failure to attack Sandy Hook and the pilots—middling men who did not write their own narratives of the war were a convenient place to assign that blame. Related Historic Site : Hartshorne Woods Park Sources : David Ramsey, The History of the American Revolution, Liberty Fund: Indianapolis, 1990, Vol. 2, 88-89; Edmund Burke, Annual Register, 1778 (London: J. Dodsley, 1778) p228; John Campbell, Lives of British Admirals Containing New and Accurate Naval History (London: J. Robinson, 1779) vol. 4, p415-7; Samuel Cooper to Benjamin Franklin, Ben Franklin Papers online: http://franklinpapers.org/franklin/framedVolumes.jsp?vol=37&page=240a002 ; Richard Wescott to Congress, National Archives, Papers of the Continental Congress, M247, I78, Misc Letters to Congress, v 23, p 509; George Washington to David Forman, Library of Congress, George Washington Papers, Series 4, General Correspondence; George Washington to Henri D’Estaing, Library of Congress, George Washington Papers, Series 4, reel 50, July 13, 14, and 17, 1778; George Washington to William Dobbs, Library of Congress, George Washington Papers, http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/mgw:@field(DOCID+@lit(gw120218)) ; Henri D’Estaing in Henri Donoil, ed., Histoire de la Participation de la France à l'Etablissement des EtatsUnisd'Amerique: Correspondance Diplomatique et Documents, 5 vols. (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1876–99), vol. 3, pp. 327-32, 447-9; Alexander Hamilton to George Washington in Naval Documents of the American Revolution (Naval History Foundation: Washington DC, 2018) vol 13, p 405; Henri D’Estaing to George Washington in Jared Sparks, Correspondence of the American Revolution: Being Letters of Eminent Men (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1853) pp. 157-8; George Washington to William Dobbs, Library of Congress, George Washington Papers, Series 4, reel 50, July 15 - 20, 1778; Jacobus Van Zandt to George Clinton, The Public Papers of George Clinton, (Albany: State of New York, 1899) v 4, p561; Journal of French Navy Frigate Engageante, Capitaine de vaisseau Charles-René, Chevalier de Gras-Préville, July 19, 1778, in FrPNA, Marine B4, vol. 147, fol. 58. Accessed via https://navydocs.org/ ; Alexander Hamilton to George Washington, Library of Congress, George Washington Papers, Series 4, reel 50, July 20, 1778; Naval Documents of the American Revolution (Naval Historical Foundation, Washington DC, 2019), vol 13, 448; Jonathan Lawrence, Journal, Naval Documents of the American Revolution (Naval History Foundation: Washington DC, 2018) vol 13, p 468; Henri D’Estaing to George Washington, Naval Documents of the American Revolution (Naval History Foundation: Washington DC, 2018) vol 13, p 653; George Washington to Henri D’Estaing, The Papers of George Washington, Revolutionary War Series, vol. 16, 1 July–14 September 1778, ed. David R. Hoth. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2006, p. 172; Journal of Lt. Jean Julian LeMauff in Naval Documents of the American Revolution (Naval History Foundation: Washington DC, 2018) vol 13, p 359-360; George Washington to John Sullivan, Library of Congress, George Washington Papers, http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/mgw:@field(DOCID+@lit(gw120243)) ; Extract of a Letter from a Gentleman on board the Fleet, with Lord Howe to his Friend in London, dated Sandy-Hook, July 28,” The London Chronicle, 22–24 Sept. 1778. Accessed via https://navydocs.org/ ; Lapeyrouse de Bonfils, Léonard Léonce, Histoire de la Marine Française, Par M. le Comte (Chez Dentu, Librarie, Palais Royal Galerie D'Orleans, Paris, 1845) v. 3, pp45-48. Previous Next

The articles in the collection 250 for the 250th: The American Revolution in Monmouth County represent the most complete history of this topic ever assembled. < 250 Home < Previous pg. Next > Pulaski's Legion and the Osborn Island Massacre by Michael Adelberg Patrick Ferguson was among the most energetic officers of the Revolutionary War. His attack on Pulaski’s Legion was among the most brutal Revolutionary War incidents to occur in New Jersey. - October 1778 - On October 5, 1778, a 1,000-man British-Loyalist raiding party reached Little Egg Harbor (called Egg Harbor at the time), just south of Monmouth County. They blocked the harbor entrance and, with disaffected locals as guides, 300 men in four galleys went upriver to Chestnut Neck, New Jersey’s privateer boomtown . Brief cannon-fire from the boats scattered the local militia from the town. On October 8, the valuable British merchant ship, Venus , and ten other vessels were unloaded and then burned, as were the warehouses and the town’s unarmed fort. Some smaller vessels escaped by upriver, but the success of the attack was near-total. The raiders returned to the mouth of Mullica River at Egg Harbor. One of their larger ships, Granby , grounded in the harbor and this may be why the raiders stayed in Egg Harbor for the next week. During that time, the raiders sent out parties to destroy nearby salt works (a favorite target of Loyalist raiders) and take unwitting privateers entering the harbor. British leader, Edmund Burke, received a report that the raiders then razed “three salt works, and several stores were destroyed. The Raleigh , a fine American frigate was taken.” The British also sent a party to Cranberry Inlet (the entrance to the shore’s second busiest privateering port of Toms River ) to capture another vessel. Even before the raiders razed Chestnut Neck, American forces were moving to defend the area. Thinking the attack would be made against Elizabethtown, Governor William Livingston mistakenly sent militia from several counties in the opposite direction of the attack. However, George Washington had better intelligence and ordered the new Legion of Kasimir Pulaski (officered by Europeans but manned by Americans) and the artillery regiment of Thomas Proctor to defend Egg Harbor. By October 8, a formidable collection of American forces neared the area: 250 men under Pulaski, 220 men in Proctor's Artillery Regiment with cannon, 50 Philadelphia militia, and 300 Monmouth militia under Samuel Forman. But the American forces were uncoordinated—arriving at different times, from different directions. Pulaski left Trenton for Egg Harbor on October 6 and, according to the New Jersey Gazette "marched for that place with all his troops in high spirits and with great alacrity." Lacking the strength to attack the British, Pulaski camped ten miles north of their ships, on Osborn Island—a swampy piece of land at the edge of Egg Harbor and the southern tip of present-day Ocean County. Local histories say they stayed in the homes of John Ridgeway and Jeremiah Ridgeway, members of a disaffected Stafford Township family. Though most of the recruits into Pulaski’s legion were Marylanders and Pennsylvanians, at least one Monmouth Countian enlisted in the Legion as they marched to Osborn Island. Joseph Coward enlisted for eighteen months and probably guided the Legion to its camp, where they arrived no later than October 10. Jonathan Pettit of Egg Harbor would later submit a claim for feeding Pulaski’s men with 40 fowls, 1 barrel of cider, and 2 1/2 yards of new cloth (total value L20 S7) "taken by the men under Genl. Pulaski” on October 10. By October 14, a stalemate of sorts existed at Egg Harbor. The British raiding force was too strong to be attacked, but Proctor and Philadelphia militia had moved up the Mullica River to defend the state’s interior. To the north, Pulaski and the arriving Monmouth militia blocked further raids into Monmouth County. (The activity of the New Jersey militia is discussed in another article.) Pulaski’s position was revealed to the British by Carl Joseph Juliat, an officer under Pulaski who deserted to the British. Local teenagers, Thomas Osborn, and Richard Osborn were compelled to serve guides to the British. Well informed about Pulaski’s vulnerable camp, a British-Loyalist party under Captain Patrick Ferguson determined to row ten miles to attack Pulaski’s Legion at night. The Osborn Island Massacre The reports of Count Pulaski to the Continental Congress and Captain Ferguson to General Henry Clinton describe what happened on Osborn Island: Pulaski reported having his camp revealed to Captain Ferguson: “One Juliat, an officer lately deserted to the enemy, went off with them… with three men whom he debauched and two others whom they forced with them.” Ferguson reported similarly: “A Captain and six men from Pulaski’s Legion defected to us” and provided information on Pulaski’s camp. Ferguson opted to attack because “the winds detained us” at Egg Harbor. Pulaski’s description of the attack: The enemy, no doubt excited by this Juliat, attacked us at three o’clock in the morning with 400 men. They seemed at first to attack our pickets with fury, who lost a few men in retreating. Then the enemy advanced on our infantry. The Lieut. Col. Baron DeBose, who headed these men, fought vigorously, was killed with several bayonet wounds, as well as Lieut. De la Boderie and a small number of soldiers and others were wounded. This slaughter would not have ceased so soon if on the first alarm had I not hastened with my cavalry to support the infantry which then kept up a good countenance; the enemy soon fled in great disorder and left behind a great quantity of arms, accoutrements, hats, blades, etc… We took some prisoners and should have taken many more had it not been for a swamp through which our horses could scarcely walk. Ferguson’s account of the attack differs on key facts: At eleven last night 250 men were embarked and, after rowing ten miles, landed at four in the morning within a mile of a defile, which we happily secured, and leaving thirty men for its defence, pushed forward upon the infantry of the Legion, cantoned in three different houses, who are almost entirely cut to pieces. We numbered among their dead about fifty and several officers among whom we learn are a Lieutenant Colonel, a Captain and Adjutant. It being a night attack, little quarter could, of course, be given; so that there are only five prisoners. Pulaski reported that immediately after the battle, he was unable to “cut off the retreat [desertion] of about 25 men, who retired into the country and the woods.” Given the loss of these men and deaths from the battle, he could not launch a significant counter attack. Pulaski did not report that the arriving Gloucester County militia attacked Ferguson’s raiders during its withdrawal, but was badly defeated. Ferguson also discussed the withdrawal, “The rebels attempted to harass us in our retreat but with great modesty, so that we returned at our leisure, and re-embarked in security.” Ferguson reported his losses at only two dead and two wounded. One Loyalist newspaper claimed that 60 of Pulaski’s men were killed, another stated 53. American newspapers reported Pulaski’s losses “at about 30 men killed or missing.” Subsequent accounts reveal additional information on the so-called Osborn Island Massacre. Ferguson reported that his men spared the homes of James Willett and the Ridgeways, who hosted Pukaski’s men: “as the houses belonged to inoffensive Quakers, who may have already suffered sufficiently in the night's confusion." But Ferguson was also callous about killing Pulaski’s Legion “which is entirely cut to pieces.” He explained, “It being a night attack, little quarter could be given.” With accusations building about the brutality of the attack, Ferguson wrote a second account of the attack ten days after his first report: Capt. Ferguson set off in the night in boats with 250 men, rowed ten miles, landed, marched one mile to a bridge, at which he left fifty men, with the rest he marched a mile farther, surprised and cut to pieces the infantry of Pulaski's legion. Our soldiers were highly irritated against this brutal foreigner, who had given out in public orders to his men, never to give any quarter; in consequence of which our people took only five prisoners, all the rest, were left on the spot, the business being done with the bayonet only. Yet even here Capt. Ferguson had an opportunity of exercising his humanity; the houses in which were the baggage and equipage of Pulaski's legion, belonging to inoffensive Quakers, he left them untouched, rather than distress the innocent inhabitants by burning the quarters. Ferguson further noted his need to strike quickly given that “the rebel Colonel Proctor being within two miles with a corps of artillery." British political leader, Edmund Burke, reading reports from America, wrote that Pulaski’s sleeping men “were almost entirely put to the sword.” Burke also claimed that “Pulaski had given orders that no quarter should be given to our troops." Pulaski’s alleged order to grant no quarter seems unlikely since it was Ferguson who launched the pre-dawn surprise attack. Continental Army General William Heath was outraged by Ferguson’s murderous conduct and the weakness of the “no quarter” excuse: They surprised a part of Pulaski's legion in that neighborhood [Osborn Island], whom they handled very severely. The British pretended that they had heard that Pulaski had instructed his men not to give them quarter; they therefore anticipated retaliation. A British captain, Charles Steadman, clarified the controversy over Pulaski’s alleged “no quarter” order: Captain's Ferguson's soldiers were highly irritated by intelligence immediately before received from the deserters [of Pulaski's Legion] that Count Pulaski had given out in public orders to his Legion, no longer to grant quarter to British troops. This intelligence afterwards appeared false; but in the meantime, Captain Ferguson's soldiers acted under the impression that it was true. Ferguson’s party returned to their ships at 10 a.m. on October 15. The invasion flotilla weighed anchor that afternoon but had to leave behind and burn their flagship, Zebra , which had grounded. They had orders raid along the shore on their back. Ferguson recalled that his men were to "employ ourselves” by “looking into Barnegat and Cranberry Inlets, and destroy and bring off any vessels that may happen to be there, and demolish the saltworks, which are very considerable on the shores of these recesses." Slowed by contrary winds, the British did not return to Sandy Hook until October 22. Back on Osborn Island, a mob took young Thomas and Richard Osborn, who had guided Ferguson’s men. According to local histories, the mob would have hanged the Osborns but one of Pulaski’s officers saved them by arresting them. Pulaski wrote on October 16, “Two men who guided the enemy were taken in that operation, I have ordered them to Trenton, with some prisoners and arms.” The Osborns were charged with treason and acquitted on October 30 (presumably because they were forced to assist Ferguson). As for Pulaski, his Legion was decimated and humiliated. They headed north though poor and disaffected neighborhoods where the locals had no love for either European officers or their out-of-state recruits. Pulaski’s difficult march is the subject of the next article.\ Related Historic Site : Little Egg Harbor Friends Meeting House Sources : Franklin Kemp, A Nest of Rebel Pirates (Egg Harbor, NJ: Batsto Citizens Committee, 1966) pp 22-4; Wilson, Harold F., The Jersey Shore: A Social and Economic History of the Counties of Atlantic, Cape May, Monmouth and Ocean (New York: Lewis Historical Publishing Company, 1953) pp. vol. 216-217; John Stillwell, Historical and Genealogical Miscellany (Baltimore: Genealogical Publishing Co., 1970) v3, p477; Library of Congress, Early American Newspaper, New Jersey Gazette, reel 1930; Franklin Kemp, A Nest of Rebel Pirates (Egg Harbor, NJ: Batsto Citizens Committee, 1966) pp 3-5, 29-35; Private Correspondence: Jack Fulmer, Personal Map of Egg Harbor; Damages by Americans, Burlington County Ledger, claim #59, New Jersey State Archives; William MacMahon, South Jersey Towns (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1973) p 302; David Fowler, egregious Villains, Wood Rangers, and London Traders (Ph.D. Dissertation: Rutgers University, 1987) p 192; National Archives, revolutionary War veterans Pension Applications, New Jersey - Joseph Coward; National Archives, revolutionary War veterans Pension Applications, New Jersey - Jacob Davidson; National Archives, Papers of the Continental Congress, M247, I42, Petitions to Congress, v 1, p 214; Library of Congress, Rivington's New York Gazette, reel 2906; William Livingston to Lord Stirling, Carl Prince, Papers of William Livingston (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1987) vol. 2, p 457; Library of Congress, Journals of the Continental Congress, vol. 12, pp. 981, 984; New York (Royal) Gazette, October 24, 1778; Edmund Burke, An Impartial History of the War in America (R Faulder, London 1780), p 42-3; Patrick Ferguson’s account in Arthur Pierce, Smugglers' Woods, (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1960) p 50-1; Franklin Kemp, A Nest of Rebel Pirates (Egg Harbor, NJ: Batsto Citizens Committee, 1966) pp 124-5; Patrick Ferguson to Henry Clinton, Great Britain, Public Record Office, Colonial Office, CO 5, v93, reel 2, #420-37; Szymanski, Leszek, Casimir Pulaski: A Hero of the American Revolution, (New York: Hippocrene Books, Inc., 1993) pp. 211-2, 214; Richard B Martin, Runaways of Colonial New Jersey (Westminster, MD: Heritage Books, 2007) p307; William Fischer, Biographical Cyclopedia of Ocean County (Philadelphia: A.D. Smith, 1899) p 49; Patrick Ferguson, Report, The Scots Magazine, v43, p 29; Patrick Ferguson to Henry Clinton, Great Britain Public Record Office, CO 5/1089, p 151-3; William Heath, Memoirs of the American War, (Boston: Applewood, 1798), p 208; Franklin Kemp, A Nest of Rebel Pirates (Egg Harbor, NJ: Batsto Citizens Committee, 1966) pp 132-3; Frederick W. Bogert, "Sir Henry Raids a Hen's Roost,'" New Jersey History, vol. 98, n. 3-4 (Fall/Winter 1980), pp. 228-31; Richard Henry Spencer, "Pulaski's Legion," Maryland Historical Magazine, vol. 13 (1918), pp. 215-24; William Livingston to George Washington, Carl Prince, Papers of William Livingston (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1987) vol. 3, pp. 80-1. Previous Next

The articles in the collection 250 for the 250th: The American Revolution in Monmouth County represent the most complete history of this topic ever assembled. < 250 Home < Previous pg. Next > The Second New Jersey Volunteers During the Monmouth Campaign by Michael Adelberg Recruiting notices like this one were circulated through Monmouth County in June 1778. While recruiting efforts produced many recruits in 1777, only a few new Loyalists came forward in 1778. - June 1778 - As discussed in prior articles, in July 1776, Monmouth County Loyalists established the 1st and 2nd battalions of the New Jersey Volunteers (often called “Greens” based on the color of their coats). While the 1st Battalion suffered defeats and the capture of its senior officers, the 2nd Battalion was, according to historian Todd Braisted, the most successful of the original five New Jersey Volunteer battalions and appears to have had a special relationship with a British artillery regiment. In fall 1777, the 2nd Battalion was one of a small number of Loyalist units selected to join the British Army on its campaign to take Philadelphia. The 2nd Battalion was still with the British Army when it quit Philadelphia and withdrew across New Jersey in June 1778. The Second Battalion was commanded by Lt. Colonel John Morris, a former British Army lieutenant from the Seven Years War who lived on the shore, near Manasquan. Morris joined the British Army within days of its landing at Sandy Hook. He grew his battalion in 1777 to more than 200 men. According to a printed British troop return from February 1778, "Colonel Morris's regiment of Jersey Volunteers (with General Howe), green uniform" was 350 men—but this number is likely exaggerated. With France’s entry into the war in February 1778, the British chose to consolidate forces in New York—which meant quitting Philadelphia. On May 20, as they prepared to march, the New Jersey Volunteers were told to switch from green to red-uniforms, but there were no new uniforms for Morris’ men. They were ordered only to "wear their new clothing when fitted." It appears that Morris returned to New York without his men. With the march at hand and without their colonel, the officers of the 2nd Battalion increased discipline ahead of the march. On May 23, two deserters from his battalion, John McCue and John Conolly, were sentenced to 500 lashes—a sentence that likely would kill the men if carried out in full. As the British Army marched across New Jersey, the New Jersey Volunteers actively recruited. One handbill that was printed and circulated promised a bounty and western land in exchange for joining: Heroes… who are willing to serve his Majesty King George the Third, in defense of their Country, laws and constitution, against the arbitrary usurpations of a tyrannical Congress have now the opportunity of manifesting their spirit, by assisting in reducing to obedience their too long deluded countrymen, but also acquiring the polite accomplishments of a soldier, by serving only two years, or during the course of the war. Enlistees would be rewarded "with 50 acres of land, where every gallant hero may retire, and enjoy his bottle and lass. Each volunteer will receive a bounty of five dollars, besides arms, clothing and accoutrements.” There is no evidence that recruiting efforts were particularly successful. The New Jersey Volunteers continued to recruit while in Philadelphia, but his efforts brought in only twelve new men, according to an April 1778 troop return. The 2nd Battalion of New Jersey Volunteers during the Monmouth Campaign The British Army chose to rest for a day at Freehold on June 27. Officers turned a blind eye to plundering while compiling a "Return of Number of Men, Wagons, Women and Children Victualed at Monmouth." The return included a line about the 2nd Battalion. Their numbers at Freehold: 129 fit & present men and 4 women. The unusually low number of women (most regiments listed at least 15 women) might have been because a number of Monmouth women, back in their home county, left the army to visit family. That same day, the British Army convened a court martial of Chaddock Butler of Upper Freehold. Butler was arrested for stealing a British Quartermaster horse and "going directly the contrary way to that which the troops were marching." Butler claimed he was a Loyalist supporting Morris’ men: On being advertised to the rebels, on account of carrying three men of Colonel Morris's corps to New York, he was obliged to leave his own habitation & come to his uncle's who lives on the road the Army had passed, & meant to go to the King's Army, which he had just joined. Butler said he temporarily took the Quartermaster’s horse in order to pursue a rebel who rode off with one of his uncle's horses. "He took him [the horse] with the intention to return him & not steal him." Capt. Richard Robert Crowe (who captained a company of “Negro Pioneers” in the British Army) testified in support of Butler. Crowe said Butler was from a Loyalist family and "had been obliged to leave his father's on account of the situation of public affairs.” Butler returned the horse and was acquitted. On the morning of June 28, many of the 2nd New Jersey Volunteers guided the regiments guarding the British baggage train toward Middletown. The Battle of Monmouth was fought behind them. A German officer, Capt. [?] Heindrich, wrote of leaving Freehold before 6 a.m. with the "Jersey Volunteers." The baggage train was attacked by Monmouth militia and state troops led by Joshua Huddy. Heindrich wrote that "various attempts were made to capture the baggage, but these failed." That evening, while the British Army waited on the battlefield, the baggage train’s guard "encamped below Middletown." Although they were from Monmouth County, the 2nd Battalion of New Jersey Volunteers were not used as guides during the Battle of Monmouth. A British troop return noted the presence of 89 “Refugees” and 17 men from “Skinner’s corps” besides Morris’s men. Many of these men were Monmouth Loyalists who served as guides; two of whom died on the battlefield. Burlington County’s Colonel Israel Shreve of the New Jersey Line wrote his wife shortly after the battle: What is most pleasing, they had two guides, Sam Leonard and Thomas Thomson, who both lived in this neighborhood, and both killed in the first action; Leonard was lying down, took with a cannon ball in the left shoulder and came out his belly. Another guide was Chrineyonce Van Mater, jailed for his role in the capture of Richard Stockton and John Covenhoven in 1776. The New Jersey Gazette noted: "the enemy, in their late passage through Monmouth County, released Van Mater; who, having piloted them through the neighborhood, went off with them to New York." The 2nd Battalion of New Jersey Volunteers continued to pilot the front of the British Army toward Sandy Hook, their departure point. A return of Loyalist regiments on the Monmouth Campaign was compiled on July 10. It listed the 2nd Battalion as having four men killed, six captured, and one deserted during the march. The four fatalities occurred on June 27 and June 28, suggesting the men were lost in skirmishing, quite possibly against Monmouth militia. Other Loyalist regiments on the march did not lose as many men: the West Jersey Loyalists and Maryland Loyalists each had one man killed; the First Battalion of Pennsylvania Loyalists had no fatalities. The men in Morris’s battalion captured during the march across New Jersey were William Rogers, Vincent Swem, Roger Wilson, Richard Marigson, Jacob Fagan, and Joseph Grooms. All were taken in Monmouth County, June 26-28. They were jailed in Morris County until August, when they were transferred to the Monmouth County jail. The most noteworthy of the captures was Jacob Fagan. Fagan was indicted twice for larceny before the war before becoming a Loyalist and joining the New Jersey Volunteers. After his capture, he must have escaped jail. He then led an infamous Pine Robber gang. He was killed by a militia party in October 1778; his body gibbeted and hung on a public road. The 2nd Battalion of New Jersey Volunteers after the Battle of Monmouth After the Battle of Monmouth, the 2nd New Jersey Volunteers marched to Middletown where it appears John Morris rejoined them. A July 1778 Muster Roll demonstrates that the Monmouth Campaign was hard on the 2nd Battalion. The data below demonstrates the battalion’s diminished size and strength: John Antill (Maj.) 2 Officers 4 NCOs 3 Other 32 Privates 9 Fit and Present 15 On Command Cornelius Wardell 2 Officers 5 NCOs 0 Other 27 Privates 6 Fit and Present 15 On Command John Colden (Maj.) 3 Officers 5 NCOs 0 Other 31 Privates 11 Fit and Present 8 On Command Cornelius McLease 3 Officers 5 NCOs 0 Other 29 Privates 8 Fit and Present 8 On Command Norman McLeod 3 Officers 5 NCOs 0 Other 35 Privates 15 Fit and Present 11 On Command A full battalion had eight companies with 50 or more privates in each. Loyalist battalions rarely reached this size, but Morris’ five quarter-strength companies were small by any standard. Two additional desertions—Oliver Talman and Peter Miers—were noted on July 10. The term “on command” was a catch-all term for assignments outside of camp. Half of the fit men were on assignment—probably at Sandy Hook and the Navesink Highlands—where Morris was salvaging horses and supplies left by the British Army prior to its evacuation to New York. While the British Army returned to New York on July 5, Morris and his men stayed on Sandy Hook and the Navesink Highlands. A July 11 document lists “Navesink” as its location. On July 20, General Henry Clinton noted Morris’ location in Monmouth County, relaying intelligence on the French fleet which arrived off Sandy Hook on July 11. Lt. Coll Morris is busy in collecting intelligence of the position of the French Guard upon their Watering Parties. He means, I find, to be more particular in his Inquiries; as from the matter he has already collected, it seems practicable to make a successful attempt upon their Post. The next day, Morris met with Admiral Richard Howe, commanding the British fleet. Howe wrote: He has shown me the position the French had taken on Waddel’s Hill, from whence I conclude it is totally impracticable to make any attempt upon them. I conceived yesterday, that they were posted on this Side the Neversunk River. Our only caution on this side seems confined to any design that should be meditated, by the Neck, on Sandy Hook. Great threats are made, I find, against us on every part. Despite demonstrating his value to the British High Command, Morris was apparently becoming dispirited. He criticized the British Army’s plundering during the Monmouth campaign. He wrote General James Pattison to request standing orders that no British party leave camp without an officer in order to limit plundering. Pattison was not swayed: With respect that an officer must always be detached with men, I should imagine that upon reconsideration of the matter, you will see how incompatible it is with the rank of a commissioned officer to be sent with detachments of four or six men. Pattison acknowledged that Morris was ill and expressed hopes that his "lameness" would improve. Morris also lapsed in disciplining his men. He permitted one of his privates, Jacob Wood, to desert and live as a fisherman at Sandy Hook in exchange for supplying him with fresh fish. The arrangement was exposed in a court martial that must have embarrassed Morris. Braisted noted that Morris was insubordinate to Courtland Skinner (the general commanding the New Jersey Volunteers) in 1779, and retired from active service. His battalion would be consolidated with other undersized New Jersey Volunteer battalions. It would lose its special relationship with the British artillery regiment and the commanding officer who made it the most successful of the original five New Jersey Volunteer battalions. The demise of Morris and his battalion is discussed in greater detail in another article. Related Historic Site : Sandy Hook Lighthouse Sources : Edinburgh Magazine and Literary Miscellany, 1778, vol. 40, p 91; Troop Return, William Drummond, Library of Congress, MMC - Courtland Skinner, box 11; New Jersey State Archives, Dept. of Defense, Loyalists Collection, New Jersey Volunteers, box 1, 2L; Troop Return, NJ State Archives, Adjutant General's Loyalist Manuscripts, microfilm; Oliver DeLancey, "Orderly Book of Three Battalions of Loyalists," Collections of the New-York Historical Society (1916), vol. 6, pp. 75, 84; Israel Shreve to Polly Shreve, Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Dreer Collection, Series 52:2, vol. 4; Stephen Kemble, The Kemble Papers (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Library, 2009) vol. 1, p 585; Van Mater’s release is described in William Dwyer, The Day is ours! - November 1776 January 1777: An Inside View of The Battles of Trenton and Princeton (New York: Viking Press, 1983) p 34-5; Philip Katcher, Encyclopedia of British, Provincial, and German Army Units 1775-1783 (Harrisburg PA: Stackpole Co., 1973), p 78; Troop Returns, Library of Congress, MMC - Courtland Skinner, box 6; Troop Return, Monmouth Battlefield State Park, Battle of Monmouth files: folder - British Sources; Court Martial records, Great Britain Public Record Office, War Office, 71/86, #151-8. (Photocopies from Don Hagist.); Bruce Burgoyne, Journal of the Hesse Cassel Jaeger Corps (New York: Heritage Books, 1987) p43-7; Troop Return, Monmouth Battlefield State Park, Battle of Monmouth files: folder - Loyalist Forces; Troop Return, National Archives of Canada, RG 8, “C” Series, Volume 1854, page 20; Muster Rolls of New Jersey Volunteers, Institute for Advanced Loyalist Studies, www.royalprovincial.com ; National Archives of Canada, RG 8, “C” Series, Volume 1854, page 20; Clements Library, U Michigan, Henry Clinton Papers, 6/28/78, Return of Persons Victualed at Monmouth; Troop Return, Great Britain, Public Record Office, Colonial Office, CO 5, v93, reel 4, #226; Henry Clinton to Richard Howe, Naval Documents of the American Revolution (Naval History Foundation: Washington DC, 2018) vol 13, p 445; Richard Howe to Henry Clinton, Naval Documents of the American Revolution (Naval History Foundation: Washington DC, 2018) vol 13, p 467; Troop Return, William Clements Library, Henry Clinton Papers, vol. 68; James Pattison to John Morris, Monmouth Battlefield State Park, Battle of Monmouth files: folder - British Sources; A History of the Second Battalion of the New Jersey Volunteers, http://www.royalprovincial.com/military/rhist/njv/2njvhist.htm . 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The articles in the collection 250 for the 250th: The American Revolution in Monmouth County represent the most complete history of this topic ever assembled. < 250 Home < Previous pg. Next > New York Tories Find Refuge in Shrewsbury by Michael Adelberg Isaac Lowe served in the 1st Continental Congress and led protests against British policies, but he did not support independence. Fearing for his safety, he left New York for Shrewsbury. - July 1776 - The arrival of the British fleet on June 29 set the Loyalists of New York and New Jersey in motion. In Monmouth County, some Loyalists assembled and joined the British Army on Sandy Hook. However, many other Loyalists, due to age or preference, had no interest in serving in the British Army. They sought a place of safety as they came under increasing scrutiny from the Revolutionary governments of New York and New Jersey. Shrewsbury, where resistance to the Continental cause was well known, was such a place. New Yorkers Hide in Shrewsbury Township The first evidence of New York Loyalists seeking refuge in Shrewsbury is in the minutes of the New York Convention. On July 18, that body recorded “that John L. C. Roome requests that he may be sent a prisoner, on his parole, to Shrewsbury.” It is not recorded whether Roome’s relocation to Shrewsbury was approved, but he was in Shrewsbury, with or without consent, a week later. On July 26, Governor William Livingston wrote to Samuel Tucker, President of the New Jersey Convention: I have authentic information that some of the most malignant New York Tories have seated themselves in Shrewsbury; a very improper place on account of the facility it affords for keeping up a communication with the Enemy. Isaac Lowe and one Roome [John Roome] are particularly mentioned. That same day, Nathaniel Woodhull of New York Convention informed George Washington and the New Jersey Convention that New York Loyalists were seeking refuge in Shrewsbury. Woodhull had deposed Balthazar DeHart, a lawyer who practiced in the Monmouth County courts. He reported: When he [DeHart] left Shrewsbury, far the greater part of that place was inhabited, or rather, infested, with Tories... he has understood that their disaffection has been greatly increased by a number of persons who have gone from New York, and secretly labored to deceive the lower set of people, the higher being almost all disaffected. Woodhull named some of the Loyalists: Isaac Low, William Walton, Anthony Van Damm, John Roome, William Kipping, and [?] Hullet "a dance master." Woodhull also reported on the activities of Shrewsbury Loyalists: Joseph Wardell, John Corlies, and George Allen, went the week before last, or last week, to General Howe's camp, on Staten-Island, after, as they pretended, two negroes, who had run away from William Kipping and the said John Corlies; that they stayed some time there. The “negroes were delivered to them by Howe's order” which Woodhull took as proof that the Shrewsbury residents had pledged themselves Loyal to the British King (a prior British order said that slaves of rebels who agreed to serve the British cause would be freed, but slaves of Loyalists would not be freed. This might have increased unrest in Shrewsbury’s Black community). Dealing with New Yorkers in Shrewsbury Township On August 5, the New York Government sought to stop the further migration of Loyalists to New Jersey. It issued a public notice banning unauthorized travel: "No person whatsoever, either male or female, above the age of 14 will be permitted to pass to the State of New Jersey without a proper pass." The notice was not only printed in New York newspapers, it was also printed in Philadelphia papers. In 1776, New Jersey had no newspaper. Calls were made to the New Jersey government to take action against the New York Loyalists in Shrewsbury and the disaffected providing refuge to those Loyalists. On August 7, an anonymous New Yorker wrote Governor Livingston: I have received repeated information that a number of persons known to be inimical to the cause of the United States, or of suspicious character, have lately removed from this place [New York] into the County of Monmouth in New Jersey, with intent, no doubt, of communicating with and aiding our enemies. That same day, George Washington wrote the New Jersey Legislature a very similar letter (suggesting collaboration between the New Yorker and Washington’s aide-de-camp): I have received repeated information that a number of persons known to be inimical to the cause of the American States or of suspicious character have lately removed from this and other places to the County of Monmouth with the intent, no doubt... of communicating with and aiding the enemy. I must urge the necessity of your Congress of adopting the same measure [for arresting Loyalists] in all those parts of the Province that are contiguous to the enemy. Nine days later, George Washington wrote to the Councils of Safety of New York and New Jersey: I am informed, that in Consequence of my Letter acquainting you that a number of Persons deemed unfriendly to the Interests of America, were suspected of holding a Correspondence with the Enemy from Shrewsbury and its Neighborhood; Mr. Isaac Low late of this City has been apprehended, and is now detained under some kind of Confinement. Isaac Lowe was arrested, but released three days later. Without a sheriff [sheriff Elisha Lawrence was with the British] or functioning courts, it fell to the Monmouth County Committee to take action against the New York Loyalists in Shrewsbury and their local collaborators. On August 24, John Holmes of the Shrewsbury Township Committee sent a lengthy letter to Woodhull summarizing the Committee’s actions. Holmes broadly agreed with Woodhull’s characterization of disaffection in Shrewsbury: “Many parts of the County are exceedingly infested with Tories of the most inveterate disposition, owing in great measure to the malign influence of our late Attorney General.” This was reference to Courtland Skinner, the Attorney General under the Royal government, who was courting Loyalists to join the New Jersey Volunteers , of which he was named its Brigadier General. Holmes further suggested that the Shrewsbury township committee was, itself, disaffected and not to be trusted. As a result, the County Committee “constituted a sub-committee from our body, who are authorized to cite every inhabitant of New York within the Township of Shrewsbury to appear before them, and show cause why they not be immediately removed." John Holmes also discussed the three disaffected Shrewsbury residents who had visited the British Army on Staten Island to retrieve the runaway slaves: “They went under Col. [George] Taylor's permission, who granted them a flag [permission]; they had not been qualified. We have put them under oath, and have not been able to make any very important discoveries." Holmes discussed attempts to curb illegal trade with the British: A number of armed vessels have frequently been at anchor and hovering near the coast, and we have no doubt have had frequent intercourse with and supplies from the disaffected from this County... Our guards are now on the spot, and we have given orders that all stock be immediately driven from all beaches, we flatter ourselves that the enemy will be disappointed in any future attempt to procure provisions. Holmes claimed that "Gen. [Hugh] Mercer has arrived with a Continental guard at Shrewsbury, who have orders to seize and detain all craft belonging to said shores, and to apprehend such suspicious persons ...several arrests have been made." Continental Army records mention Continental guards in Shrewsbury but do not document General Mercer being at Shrewsbury.) However, Holmes’s account of driving livestock from the shore is corroborated by the records of the New Jersey Convention which, on July 23, recorded: Unanimously resolved and directed that the County Committee of Monmouth proceed, without delay, to remove all stock on their coast which may be in danger of falling into the hands of the enemy, back into the country. Holmes concluded that the events in Shrewsbury were exhausting the County Committee: "We have spent more time and undergone more vexation and fatigue than any other Committee of this State." The Monmouth County Committee likely uncovered some of the New Yorkers, but did not root out all of them. On December 3, 1776, Robert Bowne of Queens, New York, sent a letter from Shrewsbury to his brother in New York. Bowne summarized his status “in this time of great calamity,” he wrote: I have endeavored to avoid giving offence to any, have associated with very few, which I have found to be much the safest as there are many warm persons near us that are scratching at everything they can take the least advantage of to distress those who do not approve of their violent and unjust proceedings. He also discussed other New Yorkers still hiding in Shrewsbury. “The New Yorkers have all been threatened that they should be drove away from this quarter, tho' they [Whigs] have never put it in execution; many that was here have returned to New York.” The disaffection in Shrewsbury revealed in the letters of Woodhull and Holmes would soon be corroborated by the actions of a large association of Loyalists at Long Branch. Historic Site : Christ Church Sources : New York Committee of Safety, July 18, 1776, Convention, Committee of Safety and Council of Safety of the state of New-York : 1775-1777, 2 vols., (Albany : Thurlow Weed, printer to the State, 1842) v. 1, item 541; Carl Prince, Papers of William Livingston (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1987) vol. 1, p 107; Peter Force, American Archives: Consisting of a Collection of Authentick Records, State Papers, Debates, and Letters and Other Notices of Publick Affairs (Washington, DC: U.S. Congress Clerk's Office, 1853), 5th Series, vol. 1, p 602-3; The Library Company, Pennslyvania Ledger, vol. 1, Jan. 1775-Nov. 1776; Paul Burgess, A Colonial Scrapbook; the Southern New Jersey Coast, 1675-1783 (New York, Carlton Press, 1971) pp 109; John Fitzpatrick, ed., The Writings of George Washington from the Original Manuscript Sources (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1932) vol. 5, p 388; Selections from the Correspondence of the Executive of New Jersey, From 1776 to 1786 (Newark, NJ: Newark Daily Advertiser, 1848) p 7; New Jersey Convention resolve, Peter Force, American Archives: Consisting of a Collection of Authentick Records, State Papers, Debates, and Letters and Other Notices of Publick Affairs (Washington, DC: U.S. Congress Clerk's Office, 1853), 5th Series, vol. 6, p 1651; Library of Congress, George Wahsington Papers, http://memory.loc.gov/cgibin/query/r?ammem/mgw:@field(DOCID+@lit(gw050383)) ; Peter Force, American Archives: Consisting of a Collection of Authentick Records, State Papers, Debates, and Letters and Other Notices of Publick Affairs (Washington, DC: U.S. Congress Clerk's Office, 1853), 5th Series, vol. 1, p 1534-5; Rutgers University Special Collections, Robert Bowne, AC 1246. 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The articles in the collection 250 for the 250th: The American Revolution in Monmouth County represent the most complete history of this topic ever assembled. < 250 Home < Previous pg. Next > Lt. Colonel Gurney's Campaign Against Monmouth Loyalists by Michael Adelberg Francis Gurney led a regiment of Pennsylvanians on a month-long campaign during which he scattered Loyalists and seized large amounts of provisions intended for the British Army. - January 1777 - On January 2, 1777, Pennsylvania troops, under Lt. Colonel Francis Gurney, routed the newly-raised Loyalist militia of Monmouth County in a short battle just east of Freehold. Yet even with the Loyalist militia scattered, other aspects of the embryonic Loyalist regime remained in place in Middletown and Shrewsbury —at least until Gurney toppled them. Dispersing the Remaining Armed Loyalists A week after the battle near Freehold, a group of armed Loyalists caught the attention of the Continental Army. On January 9, General Israel Putnam, stationed at Crosswicks, wrote: “The Tories of Monmouth County are again in arms, Col. Gurney marched today to suppress them; the militia of the neighborhood of Cranbury are embodied and impatient to join and assist them." Two days later, Putnam reported to Congress on the continued Loyalist threat: The Tories of Monmouth are making great head, ravaging and plundering and disarming the well-affected inhabitants. I have sent off 200 men with Colonel Gurney, he will be joining some of the militia. I have no doubt of hearing of his success in a day or two. The location of the armed Loyalists is not stated but it is probable that they were based near present-day Matawan. A Loyalist association led by the wealthy merchant Thomas Kearney was operating there. This part of Monmouth County was near the British Army base at Perth Amboy and there are mentions in antiquarian sources of a stockyard there for supplying the British. One of Gurney’s soldiers, Robert Strain, recalled seizing a ship, presumably near the stockyard. “They went to Middletown NJ where they took a prize supposed to be worth 100,000 pounds, and which supplied the whole army all winter." Gurney likely scattered the Loyalists near Matawan and then moved on. By January 14, he was in Shrewsbury where he scattered another Loyalist party. He then wrote to Putnam to request a cannon and wagons: I must beg you Immediately send me one field piece. I find the enemy have not got their vessels out of the creek [Shrewsbury River], and should the Artillery come in time have no doubt of taking them. We have more plunder or rather King’s stores than we can get wagons to carry off. I wish you would send forward all the wagons you can collect. I would advise a company to be sent to the Court House in order to press wagons and bring them down. Gurney also warned about a future confrontation with Loyalists: “I am just now Informed that the Enemy have landed a party at Red Bank to the northward of Black Point, and am determined to march that way immediately with about one hundred men.” The next day, a party of Pennsylvanians under Colonel Richard Humpton chased a Loyalist group into a waiting boat. The Loyalists “were obliged to make a precipitate retreat on board the English men of war.” The Curious Case of the Good Intent Gurney also wrote the Pennsylvania Court of Admiralty (New Jersey lacked an Admiralty Court until 1778) a lengthy letter about the schooner, Good Intent , commanded by Captain Sands. The vessel was “employed to transport supplies to the Fleet and Army of the King of Great Britain” until it beached near Black Point. Gurney took possession of the vessel and claimed its cargo of sugar, spirits, and clothing as a “lawful Prize & Booty of War.” He asked the court to consider the capture so that it “may be adjudged and condemned as forfeited and a lawful Prize." According to depositions taken by Gurney, the Good Intent went from Jamaica to Sandy Hook and communicated with the Light House. But it was too far away to be protected when a French privateer under Captain Morderet chased it. The Good Intent beached at Black Point. A sailor from the Good Intent testified: That after landing they all went up to a small house & there slept that Night. That the next Day they applied to the Inhabitants for assistance and about eighty or a hundred came down for that Purpose & got on Shore a very considerable Part of the Cargo. From Sandy Hook, the British saw the activity. They “sent a Tender & two armed Boats to prevent the same means from saving any more of the Cargo & Destroy the Vessel.” But the crew of the Good Intent and locals (many of whom were likely disaffected from Continental cause) now fought the British in order to preserve the valuable cargo and vessel. The sailor testified that the British “were beat off by the Americans. This deponent & two of the Crew took arms to assist in beating off the Enemy.” With his vessel in the hands of Whigs, the owner of the Good Intent , D. Chenier, issued a public notice: To all Persons whom it may or shall concern in the Monmouth County in the Jerseys, Be pleased to deliver Capt. Sands the sundry articles saved from the Schooner Good Intent cast on Shore from Jamaica as he commanded that Vessel. The status of the Good Intent was not quickly decided. As late as 1779, the Pennsylvania Court of Admiralty was seeking to determine who was entitled to the vessel and its cargo. Benjamin Randolph, a merchant from Toms River, testified that he was releasing his claim to the vessel’s cargo, some of which was stored with him. Randolph suggested that he was the one who told Gurney of the vessel and Loyalist stores at Shrewsbury. Randolph also said he “went to Black Point, took some Prisoners & returning found some stores at the House of one Hartshorne [probably Esek Hartshorne].” Randolph suggested that the French privateer did not have a valid claim to the vessel because he accepted a lesser payment: ”While the wagons were loading, Morderet asked leave to put a little box of his on the wagons and go to Philadelphia and had leave.” It is unknown whether the Good Intent and its cargo were condemned to Gurney, Sands, or Morderet. It is unlikely that Chenier received any compensation for the lost vessel. Like the Betsy , profiled in an earlier article, the Good Intent shows how complicated it was to determine ownership of captured vessels. Capturing Loyalist Stores While Gurney was at Shrewsbury, Col. Humpton’s Pennsylvania soldiers entered Monmouth County and seized Loyalist stores on January 15. The Pennsylvania Journal & Weekly Advertiser reported: “A party of Col. Humpton's Regiment… went to Shrewsbury in Monmouth, where they took a large quantity of cloth and other stores collected by a sett of Tories, who infest that county.” Sergeant William Young, a prisoner of the British at Perth Amboy, reported on January 18: “Colonel Gurney has taken 90 baggage Wagons… 9 of the 90 wagons taken from the Enemy by Colonel Gurney are ammunition wagons.” General Putnam also wrote of Gurney’s windfall on the same day: He has taken a good quantity of stores that were sent there for the Tories enlisted under Morris [John Morris] and Lawrence [Elisha Lawerence] – thirty-five wagon loads of which have arrived at Crosswicks, and the Col supposes that about one hundred wagon loads still remaining; he discovers more daily -- they chiefly consist of rum, wine, pork and broad cloth. I have thought it best to let Lt. Col. Gurney stay down where he is, until the militia of that county are well-embodied, so as to be able to defend themselves. On January 20, Putnam noted receiving three prisoners from Shrewsbury – two were junior officers in the New Jersey Volunteers , John Throckmorton and Charles Cook. The third was none other than Colonel Charles Read. Read was the Burlington County militia colonel who led campaigns against Upper Freehold Loyalists in July and Shrewsbury Loyalists in November. After being confronted by Monmouth County’s Colonel David Forman and refusing to take a loyalty oath to the Continental government, Read sought to go over to the British. But he was taken by the Continental Army and detained. Read had been “discharged on giving his word not to quit Phila without leave.” Caesar Rodney at Trenton wrote on January 23 that Gurney had taken "a very large quantity of stores that were lodged there [Shrewsbury] and guarded by Skinner's Jersey Volunteers. Forty wagon loads of them arrived at Princetown, a great quantity of clothes and other English goods." The next day, General Putnam wrote Gurney about "Mr. Crane at Toms River” who “has collected a number of men and seized a quantity of wine.” Putnam asked Gurney to coordinate with Crane on the seizure. The enthusiasm with which the Pennsylvanians confiscated goods placed them at odds with leading local Whigs at least once. On January 29, Gurney wrote Daniel Hendrickson, the colonel of the Shrewsbury militia: "I am sorry that your man did not stay by the wagon; there is not the least foundation for us keeping the wagon, and let it be found where it will; you shall not only have it and the horses, but be paid for the hire of the team." Gurney, it appears, seized Hendrickson's wagon and team by accident. Gurney’s campaign was important enough to be reported in the newspapers of far-away cities. The Providence Gazette reported that “a party of our men under the command of General Putnam have taken 96 wagons at Monmouth, in New Jersey, loaded with baggage and belonging to the parcel of Tories." The Virginia Gazette half-correctly reported that Gurney “has retaken all the Hessian plunder which was stored at Shrewsbury meeting-house, with their clothes and necessaries, to the amount of 120 wagon loads." This report reveals that the Christ Church in Shrewsbury, a focal point of Loyalism before the war, remained so during the Loyalist insurrection. An inventory of one of Gurney’s wagon trains was compiled by Captain Francis Wade, the newly-installed Continental Commissary at Allentown. The caravan carried: “55 barrels of fresh pork, 59 sacks of peas, 3 turces of rice, 1 half-pipe of wine, 7 casks of rum, 3 barrels of sugar, 1 cask of limes, 17 hatchets, 2 iron pots, 3 iron kettles, and a half cask of oil.” Its total value was £905. Wade also noted that 20 casks of rum had already "went forward by Colo. Humpton to Morristown" and one pipe of wine and sugar was sent ahead to Philadelphia. The End of the Campaign By the end of January, Gurney was back in Freehold. General Putnam wrote to Congress about the improved conditions in Monmouth County: "The affairs in Monmouth wears a favorable aspect. The people of that County will again return to their duties. Col. Forman is sent there to command and put them in proper state of defence." Gurney’s campaign occurred without the Monmouth County militia, which had dissolved during the December Loyalist insurrections. But one Monmouth Countian, Dr. Nathaniel Scudder, was an important guide for Gurney. Scudder described his role: I myself marched with them until the enemy was entirely dispersed & their stores at Middletown seized, when I was obliged to attend at Freehold, on both account of furnishing a team to haul them [Tory stores] off & endeavor to rally the militia of the county. When Gurney left Monmouth County on February 5, Scudder wrote a thank you note that was printed in the Pennsylvania Gazette “expressing my gratitude to Col. Gurney” for his service in “a country where so many of the inhabitants were inimical to the cause.” Scudder continued: I have the greatest reason to think the salvation of the property and security of the persons of many friends of freedom [are]… owed to the spirited exertions of the two detachments which marched into Monmouth. In short, those detachments have rescued the county from the tyranny of the Tories and put it in the power of their own militia to recover and embody themselves in such a manner as to be able to stand on their own defence. Indeed, Gurney’s campaign was a great success. Monmouth County would never again have a Loyalist association capable of governing. Whether, as Scudder suggests, the Monmouth militia was ready to defend the county is another matter; the newly-reconstituted Monmouth militia would suffer its worst defeat of the war only a week later, at the Battle of the Navesink . Related Historic Site : Christ Church Sources : Letter, General Israel Putnam, January 9, 17777, viewed at http://www.fold3.com/image/#18947576 (original at the National Archives); National Archives, Revolutionary War Veterans' Pension Application, Thomas Brewer of PA, www.fold3.com/image/#10976408 ; Samuel Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives (Harrisburg: State of Pennsylvania, 1902) First Series, vol. 4, p 771; Francis Gurney vs. The Schooner Good Intent, Tam Ploy Claimant, Register of the Court of the Admiralty of State of Pennsylvania, Jan. 28, 1779, transcribed by Michael White; William Horner, This Old Monmouth of Ours (Freehold: Moreau Brothers, 1932) p 386; Pennsylvania Archives, Papers Relating to the War of the Revolution,1859, v 3, p89; Pennsylvania Archives, Series 1, Vol V, p186; Francis Gurney vs. The Schooner Good Intent, Tam Ploy Claimant, Register of the Court of the Admiralty of State of Pennsylvania, Jan. 28, 1779, transcribed by Michael White; Archives of the State of New Jersey, Extracts from American Newspapers Relating to New Jersey (Paterson, NJ: Call Printing, 1903) vol. 1, p 277; Letters of William Young, The Pennsylvanian Magazine of History And Biography. Vol.VIII, 1884, p269; National Archives, Papers of the Continental Congress, reel 178, item 159, #35; Pennsylvania Archives, Series 2, Vol I, pg 496; Caesar Rodney, Letters to and from Caesar Rodney 1756–1784, ed. George Herbert Ryden (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1933), pp. 170-1; Israel Putnam to Francis Gurney, Neilson Family Papers, box 1, folder: Rutgersania, Rutgers University Special Collections; Rutgers University Special Collections, Francis Gurney to Daniel Hendrickson, Hendrickson Papers, box 2; Providence Gazette, February 1, 1777; Virginia Gazette, February 7, 1777; The Papers of George Washington, Revolutionary War Series, vol. 8, 6 January 1777 – 27 March 1777, ed. Frank E. Grizzard, Jr. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1998, pp. 185–186; Francis Wade, Inventory, Library of Congress, George Washington Papers, http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/P?mgw:7:./temp/~ammem_XXqo ::; Pennsylvania Archives, Series I, v5, p209; David Fowler, Egregious Villains, Wood Rangers, and London Traders (Ph.D. Dissertation: Rutgers University, 1987) p 49; Gaillard Hunt, Fragments of Revolutionary History (Brooklyn: Historical Publishing Club, 1892) pp. 112-5; Pennsylvania Gazette, February 17, 1777 (CD-ROM at the David Library, #23302). Previous Next