The Decision to Station Continental Troops in Monmouth County

Three major raids against the New Jersey shoreline in 1778—the Manasquan salt works in April, against Middletown Point in May, and against Little Egg Harbor and Osborn Island in October—demonstrated that local militia, though increasingly competent, were unable to protect the shoreline against large enemy attacks. On top of that, dozens of disaffected Monmouth County farmers continued to trade illegally with the British through Loyalist middlemen and internal Loyalist gangs. Loyalist partisans living on the shore, so-called Pine Robbers, made large parts of the shore unsafe for travelers and small militia parties.

Following the transfer of David Forman’s Additional Regiment out of Monmouth County, stationing a regiment of Continental soldiers in Monmouth County was discussed frequently. Governor William Livingston first requested troops for Monmouth County in April, but George Washington was opposed. He wrote that a regiment of Continentals would “do rather more harm than good” by attracting a larger British raiding party and then not having the strength to resist it. A Continental regiment that would not withdraw when attacked by a larger party would risk the same fate as Pulaski’s Legion on Osborn Island (the slaughter of 50 men).

In July 1778, immediately after the Battle of Monmouth, Washington dispatched Colonel Daniel Morgan’s regiment to shadow the British Army on its withdrawal to Sandy Hook but Morgan left the county within two weeks. After that, Washington committed a 30-man guard under Major Richard Howell to Shrewsbury, but Howell was there more to monitor the movements of the British fleet than to enhance the security of the area.

In November 1778, a British fleet gathered at Sandy Hook. It would head to Georgia to begin the British invasion of the southern states. But its destination at the time was unknown. Washington was irritated by the irregularity of Howell’s reports and Howell’s guard was too weak to stand any kind of attack if the British should attack from Sandy Hook. This rekindled talk of sending troops into Monmouth County.

The Decision to Send Troops into Monmouth County

Nicholas Biddle, a commissary officer, wrote his superior, Moore Furman, on November 14 "that Col. Moylan's horse [Stephen Moylan] for present be sent to Monmouth - this I think will be some relief." The next day, Lord Stirling (General William Alexander) speculated about going to the shore, “I would willingly go into Monmouth County, and with Small Vessels out of the Inlets on that Coast, give him [Washington] Intelligence of everything that passes at Sandy Hook.” Stirling did not, however, go into Monmouth County; Moylan likely did not go into Monmouth County either.

In December, rumors of an impending British attack on Monmouth County spread. This prompted Livingston to again write Washington to request troops. On December 15, the Governor wrote of the county militia:

One of their militia battalions has gone through a severe course of duty, as to be almost worn out and dispirited. The other principally consist of disaffected persons and should not be depended upon. Perhaps about 400 Continental troops stationed in that County at Middletown Point, the other at Middletown and the third at Shrewsberry [sic] might be sufficient guard, & prevent that insufferable communication and traffic constantly carried on between New York & the first and last of the places mentioned.

Washington turned away the request: “I have already distributed largely for the security of the State, and that the security of inhabitants has been a particular consideration, but it is impossible to include every place." He said that his troops were already spread thin and set up in winter quarters.  He repeated his prior concern about unsupported Continental detachments being an attractive target for the British, "small and unsupported cantonments might become objects of the Enemy.”

A month later, new intelligence circulated. The Pennsylvania Packet reported on December 19: "It is reported that the Britons and Tories intend shortly to make an excursion from New York to Shrewsberry.” Rather than send troops, local authorities were carting away endangered livestock:

It has been deemed proper to be prepared, and with this view, we are told an order has been issued to drive off the cattle from the neighborhood where it is most probable the enemy may attempt to land.

That same month, Livingston wrote Washington in greater detail about the problem posed by illegal trade from Monmouth County to New York:

Considering the number of disaffected in the County of Monmouth, it will be difficult for the Loyal citizens of that county to oppose an enemy aided by the open junction or at least secret cooperation of the Tories... I should therefore think a few Continental troops might be posted in that County to great advantage, particularly to prevent trade with New York.

Conrad Alexandre Gerard, the French Diplomat at Philadelphia, also wrote of the threat to Shrewsbury and an apparent strategy not to defend it:

It is reported that English and Tories intend to make an excursion from New York into Shrewsbury. Although it is not thought the excursion will be dangerous, and a considerable portion of the American Army is currently in the State, and an order has been given to withdraw the battle from those environs where it is most probable the enemy will try to attack.

For the third time, Governor Livingston asked Washington to station a regiment in Monmouth County. This time, Washington was sympathetic:

I find every disposition not only to afford security to the people of Monmouth and to lessen the duty of their militia, but to prevent the illicit trade and correspondence complained of between the disaffected in that county and the city of New York.

Nonetheless, Washington declined to send troops saying that he had none to spare. But he did make a request of Livingston:

The distance of any Continental troops… obliges me to desire your Excellency to give orders to the militia in that County to remove the stock near the coast, and to have particular regard for the houses of the disaffected, who always have previous notice to the designs of the enemy and lay up stores of provisions that may be at hand when they [the British] make their descent. By doing this, they screen themselves from the charge of having voluntarily contributed.

Washington was probably prompted by an anonymous letter in his possession about illegal trading through Shrewsbury. The letter claimed that "not less than one thousand sheep, five hundred hogs and eight hundred quarters or upwards of good beef, a large parcel of cheese, besides poultry" were all likely to end up in British hands.

A major action against Shrewsbury did not occur in December 1778, but intelligence continued to reach Washington about the pervasive trade with the British. Finally, on January 8, 1779, Washington was persuaded to send troops into Monmouth County. He wrote Lord Stirling:

I have received such repeated information of the trade that is carried on between Monmouth and New York… that I find it an absolute necessity of sending down a party to that quarter to put a stop to that intercourse. Be pleased therefore, to order about 250 men of the line under the command of a field officer... to go immediately upon that service.

Howell’s small guard would return to Morristown.

However, it apparently took a few weeks to identify the best regiment for the Monmouth assignment. It was not until January 30 that Washington wrote Livingston, "I had ordered a party under Colo. North into Monmouth County with a view of restraining the malpractices which prevailed there, the measure may lighten the service of the militia."

Colonel Caleb North commanded a regiment of Pennsylvania Continentals that would soon arrive in Monmouth County. North’s men would be the first of three Continental regiments (including Mordecai Gist’s mixed command and Benjamin Ford’s Marylanders) sent to northeastern Monmouth County in 1779. All three would struggle while stationed there.

Related Historic Site: Liberty Hall

Sources: Nicholas Biddle to Moore Furman in William Mauer, Dragoon Diary, The History of The Third Light Dragoons (Author House, 2005) p186; Clement Biddle to Moore Furman in C.F. Maurer, Dragoon Diary: The History of the Third Continental Light Dragoons (Bloomington, IN: Author House, 2005) note on p 184; Lord Stirling, Report, Colonial and State Records of North Carolina, v10-0437http://docsouth.unc.edu/csr/index.html/document/csr13-0396; William Livingston to George Washington, Carl Prince, Papers of William Livingston (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1987) vol. 2, pp. 512, 513-4; William Livingston to George Washington, Carl Prince, Papers of William Livingston (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1987) vol. 2, p 510.Pennsylvania Packet, December 19, 1778; George Washington to William Livingston, John Fitzpatrick, ed., The Writings of George Washington from the Original Manuscript Sources (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1932) vol. 13, p 404; Conrad Alexandre Gerard, Despatches and Instructions of Conrad Alexandre Gerard, 1778-1780, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1939) p 439; George Washington to William Livingston, John Fitzpatrick, ed., The Writings of George Washington from the Original Manuscript Sources (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1932) vol. 13, pp. 379-80; Leonard Lundin, Cockpit of the Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950) p 408; George Washington to Lord Stirling, John Fitzpatrick, ed., The Writings of George Washington from the Original Manuscript Sources (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1932) vol. 5, p 388.